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Gen Army Popov on Role of Military in Unifying Nationalities

18010604 Tashkent PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN in Russian
No 2, 1989 pp 61-65

[Article by Gen Army N. Popov in the column: "Ideology of Renewal for Revolutionary Perestroyka" column: "Army Service—A Veritable School of Internationalism"]

[Text] The 23rd of February is the 71st anniversary of the USSR Armed Forces. This glorious date is a witness to the fact that the years have not covered up the heroic past. The light of the grateful memory of generations of Soviet people illuminates the formation of the first regiments and detachments of krasnoarmeytsi, who, in response to V. I. Lenin's written decree and appeal "The socialist Fatherland is in danger!", in February of 1918 engaged the German interventionists rushing toward Petrograd. They brought the enemy advance to a stop at the Narva-Pskov line.

The task of creating the Armed Forces of the Land of the Soviets was without a doubt one of the most difficult and responsible tasks that V. I. Lenin and the Bolshevik Party faced after the victory of the Great October. They had never before been presented with such a task, even a theoretical one. Lenin advanced the concept of organizing a regular army, but this would be a new, socialist kind of army—a military organization inseparable from the people, one destined to protect their interests. Who was able to offer reliable protection to the gains won by the proletarian revolution? Only the armed working people themselves.

Every revolution, taught V. I. Lenin, should be capable of defending itself.

Our Army and Navy were created for just one purpose—to protect the Soviet system. They embodied all the characteristics of the new society: a union of the working class and laboring peasantry; friendship between the peoples of the USSR; and unity of the Army and people. History has supplied us with convincing proof of the advantages of these Armed Forces that were founded on these principles.

Bitter fighting against the White Guards and interventionists raged for more than three years. The Red Army, poorly equipped and lacking in combat experience, defeated the well-trained, professional officer- and general-led hordes of internal and external counterrevolution. The Civil War demonstrated the great power of proletarian internationalism. This power rallied all the ethnic groups and nationalities of our country to the defense of the newly-acquired socialist Fatherland. The joint struggle gave rise to the military and political Union of Soviet Republics which became one of the sources of the victories won by the Red Army.

Soviet military historians note that fighting side by side in the ranks of the protectors of the revolution were representatives of almost 50 nationalities. Serving in Soviet national military units at the beginning of 1919 were about 150,000 Ukrainians and 50,000 representatives of Muslim nationalities, more than 17,000 Chuvash, 12,000 Latvians, 3,000 Estonians, and many others from other peoples. By the end of the Civil War, the ranks of the Red Army held Armenians, Bashkirs, Belorussians, Votyaks, Jews, Zyryans, Karelians, Mari, Mordvinians, Germans, Poles, Tatars, Turkmen, Uzbeks, and others.

Incidentally, a czarist ukase ruled that almost 40 nationalities and peoples, who were in fact in a semi-colonial situation, were not eligible for service in the army and navy. This included Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Tadzhiks, Turkmen, Kalmyks, Jews, and peoples of the North and Northern Caucasus.

The shining ideals of the revolution and the just causes of the struggle for the people's happiness united the military ranks and conferred on them an unheard-of strength, inspiring them to accomplish immortal feats for the sake of their socialist Fatherland. The Red Army in the years of the Civil War took shape and grew strong as a regular combat force that was destined to guard and offer reliable protection to the constructive labor of the Soviet people, to be a stronghold of peace and security of peoples.

The USSR Armed Forces, which embodied the friendship and fraternity of the peoples of the Soviet Union, repulsed on more than one occasion militarists who dared encroach on our borders. They also stood the severe test in the form of the war against Fascist Germany. This war—the most terrible known to mankind—demonstrated that the social, political and spiritual unity of our country's laborers formed under the Soviet system and of the Armed Forces soldiers was insurmountable. In his report "October and Perestroyka: The Revolution Continues," M. S. Gorbachev stated empathically: "The aggression that was thrust upon us was a merciless test of the survivability of the socialist system, of the strength of the multinational Soviet state, of the power of the patriotic spirit of the Soviet people. We passed this test of fire and sword."

After occupying 12 European countries with the connivance of the leading imperialistic nations (USA, England), Fascist Germany exceeded the USSR in military and economic power. Her army numbered 8.5 million men. To inflict a surprise attack, the Hitlerite high command threw 190 divisions (5.5 million men) at the borders of the Soviet Union. They were armed with about 4,300 tanks and assault guns, about 5,000 aircraft, and more than 47,000 artillery pieces and mortars. Also worthy of note were the German Army's two-year combat experience and its driving combat spirit engendered by the racist theory of superiority over other peoples in which the Germans believed.

K. Marx at one time emphasized that "war subjects a nation to a test." The Soviet people passed it with honor. As true patriots, the internationalists did not waver under the fire of the Hitlerites; they did not servilely join the enemy as soldiers in anti-Soviet legions, as traitors. They continued to be an inseparable part of the unified socialist state, demonstrating their boundless devotion to the party of Lenin, showing their faithfulness to its ideals. This devotion and patriotism of the Soviet people were indeed the norm of behavior on the part of the sons and daughters of the socialist Fatherland, regardless of their national origin, in addition to their readiness to undertake heroic deeds for the sake of the Motherland. As noted in *PRAVDA* in October of 1942, "in Stalingrad, near Leningrad, in the Caucasus; in savage battles there is a mixing of blood of Russians, Uzbeks, Ukrainians, Tadzhiks, Belorussians, Azerbaijanis, and Georgians... The fraternity bound in blood shed for the Motherland is the strongest kind of fraternity. The entire Soviet nation has developed a fraternal relationship in the sacred matter of defense."

The high command conferred honors on representatives of all the peoples of the USSR for exemplary accomplishment of combat missions. The glorious cohort of Heros of the Soviet Union was joined by 8,182 Russians, 2,072 Ukrainians, 311 Belorussians, 161 Tatars, 108 Jews, 96 Kazakhs, 91 Georgians, 90 Armenians, 69 Uzbeks, 61 Mordvinians, 53 Azerbaijanis, 44 Chuvash, 39 Bashkirs, 32 Ossetians, 19 Mari, 18 Turkmen, 15 Lithuanians, 14 Tadzhiks, 13 Latvians, 12 Kirghiz, 10 Komi, 10 Udmurts, 9 Estonians, 9 Karelians, and many other sons and daughters of the fraternal family of Soviet peoples.

All military units of our field forces were the embodiment of combat fraternity of peoples. Records show that there were representatives of 30 to 50 nationalities in each division and army. They steadfastly defended every inch of Soviet soil, fighting shoulder to shoulder with representatives of the Russian people, who comprised the nucleus of the Army and Navy. Thus, hundreds of thousands of soldiers and commanders of all branches of the Army displayed self-sacrifice and heroism in the battle near Moscow. They included tankers from the renowned brigade of General M. Katukov, cavalrymen from General L. Dovator's corps, and riflemen from the 201st Latvian Rifle Division of Colonel G. Paegle. The men of the 316th Rifle Division under the command of General I. Panfilov also covered themselves with everlasting glory. Consisting mainly of Kazakhs, Uzbeks and Kirghiz, this division steadfastly held the line at the Volokolamsk Highway under the most difficult circumstances.

Many facts speak of the patriotic urge of all Soviet people to defend the socialist Motherland with a weapon in their hands. The army in the field started to receive substantial replenishments from every union and autonomous republic in the very first days of the war. An example of this can be cited in the 1,875 applications received by the Tashkent oblast military commissariat

from Soviet citizens requesting duty at the front. In 1941 the party organizations of Uzbekistan supplied 23,860 communists to the Army. Twenty percent of the responsible workers of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee were mobilized for duty at the front in the first three months of the war alone.

A noteworthy contribution to the cause of the universally historic victory attained by our people and their Armed Forces over the Fascist German invaders and the Japanese militarists was made by fighting Turkmenian soldiers, who secured the southeastern borders of the Fatherland. At that time the district was the scene of an enormous effort—training combat reserves for the field army, and forming new combat-ready units and large units on an accelerated basis. There was an outstanding indication of everlasting courage and valor on the part of district representatives in the 900 glorious sons and daughters of Central Asia and Kazakhstan that were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, with four of them—T. Begeldinov, L. Beda, S. Luganskiy, and I. Pavlov—earning the title a second time.

Six district pilots repeated the immortal feat of N. Gastello, and ten Central Asian fighters did the same after A. Matrosov's accomplishment. Their memory will live for centuries.

It should be noted that we know of about 300 Soviet fighting representatives of 20 nationalities that used their bodies to cover the embrasures of enemy bunkers. They include Russians N. Vilkov and A. Pankratov; Ukrainians A. Klepach and P. Samoylenko; Belorussians N. Averyanov and M. Belush; Uzbeks T. Rustamov and T. Erdzhigitov; Kazakhs S. Baymagambetov and S. Iskaliyev; Georgians A. Kavtaradze and V. Paulia; Azerbaijanis O. Omarov and A. Sarkisov; Armenians U. Avetisyan and S. Arakelyan; Estonians Ya. Kunder and I. Laar; Tatars S. Valiullov and G. Gafmyaiullin; Chuvash Ye. Alekseyev and N. Afanasyev; Jews Ye. Belinskiy and A. Levin; Moldavian I. Sotys; Ossetian A. Kaloyev.

The Great Patriotic War was a graphic confirmation of the correctness of the Leninist national party policy relative to military construction. The fraternal Union of Soviet peoples, founded on indissoluble community of class interests and purposes and on Marxist-Leninist ideology, gave a convincing demonstration of its survivability. The Armed Forces of the USSR took their place before the entire world as an army of patriots and internationalists, as a liberating army, one that selflessly serves in the just cause of protecting socialism and international security and peace on earth. This was another confirmation of Lenin's words: "Victory will never be achieved over a people whose laborers and peasants in their majority have known, felt and seen that they are defending their Soviet system—a system of

workers; that they are defending a cause whose victory will assure for them and their children the possibility of enjoying all the advantages of culture and all creations of labor."

An important step in the matter of assuring reliable protection of the achievements of socialism and peace in the postwar period was accomplished in 1955 with the formation of the defensive union of socialist countries—the Warsaw Pact Organization. This was a response to the creation of the NATO bloc in 1949 and the augmentation of its offensive power. Of truly historic significance was the attainment of strategic military parity between the USSR and the USA, between the Warsaw Pact and NATO.

The bolstering of socialism's position and of all progressive forces upset the plans formulated by the imperialist reaction for victory in a world-wide nuclear war. The fact that the reaction was unsuccessful in pushing humanity into a nuclear abyss is no small merit on the part of the Soviet state's Armed Forces. In protecting the ideas of the Great October, they are protecting not only the interests of many millions of people of different nationalities, but also the interests of laborers and the exploited throughout the world, of mankind's future.

We are rightfully proud that the foundation of the power of our Armed Forces consists of a community of fundamental interests of all servicemen and their realization of their enormous responsibility to the people for worthily carrying out their honorable constitutional duty as armed defenders of the socialist Fatherland. Army service brings out and strengthens the best qualities of young people; develops feelings of citizenship; and renders a person purer, stronger in spirit, richer on the inside. In carrying out their great patriotic and international mission, Soviet soldiers of the 1980s, including Turkmenian servicemen, are equal to the tasks accomplished by the defenders of revolutionary Petrograd, of those who fought to achieve victory in the Great Patriotic War.

As we all know, Soviet fighting men who served in Afghanistan functioned under exceptionally difficult conditions, with their lives at risk. Their feat of labor is an example of their loyalty to the oath, to their international duty, to the revolutionary and combat traditions of the USSR Armed Forces. About 70 internationalist fighters earned the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union; tens of thousands were awarded decorations and medals. Included among them are representatives of Uzbekistan: holder of the Red Star Order Sergeant S. Pigmetov, Privates First Class N. Gayzakharov and Kh. Ruzibayev, and others.

What strength of will, steadfastness, and readiness for self-sacrifice for the sake of the people's interests were exhibited by many enlisted men and officers in the cleanup operations at the Chernobyl AES and in the rescue work carried out following the earthquake in Armenia? "I wish

very much to express my heartfelt gratitude to the servicemen," emphatically said First Secretary of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee S. G. Arutyunyan in his republic radio speech of 17 December. "Actively participating in the rescue operations are thousands of servicemen from the Soviet Army and internal troops, brigades of military medical personnel, and a large amount of military equipment."

At the 27th Party Congress it was emphasized that "the party and government have striven and are striving to assure that the Soviet fighting man—the enlisted man and officer—is always aware of the concern and attention of society as he carries out his difficult duty; that our Army serves as a school for fostering civic responsibility, courage and patriotism." One can easily see that this amounts to a requirement set by the party, in addition to being a high evaluation of the educational role assigned to the Soviet Armed Forces. This political directive was augmented at the 19th All-Union Conference of the CPSU. "Service in the ranks of the USSR Armed Forces"—as noted in the resolution 'On Inter-Ethnic Relations'—should become a veritable school of internationalism."

Of primary importance today in international education of personnel in units and subunits is active ongoing work relative to unifying multinational military collectives and rendering them an integral whole; and exercising concern that each soldier in all situations carries the feeling that he is a full-fledged representative of a unified community—the Soviet people—regardless of his ethnic origin. This task has taken on a particular urgency as a result of the difficult and sometimes tragic events of an inter-ethnic nature that have occurred in the recent past.

The stagnation phenomena that occurred in the late 1970s and early 1980s also had an adverse effect on patriotic and international education of the Soviet people. Of no small importance in the stirring up of nationalistic passions in the USSR is imperialist propaganda. The intriguers have become emboldened. Nationalistic elements, playing on the emotions of people, obviously wish to widen inter-ethnic differences. They are successful in confusing some youth. As a result, some incoming young people bring into their units and subunits habits and nationalistic and religious prejudices that are foreign to our society.

We are standing on firm ground when we say that service in the Soviet Armed Forces by its very nature and goals units people of different ethnic origins and promotes culture of relations between peoples. Nevertheless, we must not fail to recognize difficulties of international education of servicemen. Suffice it to say that there are presently in the district, representatives of more than 50 ethnic groups, with 20 to 30 in a unit and 7 to 15 in a subunit. Hence the task: To motivate the present generation of armed defenders of the Motherland to take after their fathers and mothers, older brothers and sisters; to

be unwavering in the sacred task of adopting their fearlessness and heroism in the struggle against foreign invaders, in adding to the glory of the USSR Armed Forces.

Bearing the above in mind, members of the Military Council, officers in headquarters and the district political department are working in units to teach commanders to develop deep involvement in the fundamentals and the dynamics of processes that are occurring in multinational collectives and manage them in a skillful manner. We should know that the commander—above all people—by virtue of his position and social role in the subunit and unit is obligated to recognize the slightest nuances of relations between his subordinates, and he himself must not at any time permit the occurrence of insults to the nationalistic feelings of people "whether by carelessness or in jest," to quote Lenin. Political workers, party and Komsomol activists, in turn, are being rendered practical assistance so that they can apply the scientific recommendations for unifying multinational military collectives.

It should be noted that district line units are experiencing steady expansion of international education. It has become a good tradition to organize in the unit 10-day festivals of union republics and training centers with the goal of encouraging the development of culture of inter-ethnic relations. The district Inter-Ethnic Relations Commission has just recently held its session. Each member reported on what has been accomplished in the activity he heads. In political departments, party committees and bureaus, inter-ethnic relations groups have been set up to identify and treat the national interests of servicemen; generalize and disseminate the advanced experience gained in international education.

They consider problems associated with furthering good relations in the collective. They exhibit initiative in rendering assistance to young non-Russian servicemen in the acquisition of a specialty and in studying the Russian language. Members of the groups also see to it that the men receive newspapers and books printed in their native language and that they maintain regular correspondence with enterprises, kolkhozes and schools where they labored or studied before induction into the Army.

The many-sided ideological and party political work in progress is destined to promote the formation of a patriotic and international consciousness on the part of servicemen; strengthen their feeling of pride in the entire Soviet country and in their own republic, in their people and in the general matter of perestroika, in the activity of the vital renewal of Soviet society. Turkmen servicemen have a deep understanding of the responsibility for assuring the Soviet people's peaceful and constructive labor and for protecting the southern borders of our socialist Fatherland.

Yes, we stand for peace, for a lasting peace, one without weapons. Guided by its purely defensive doctrine, which is devoted in its entirety to resolving the most important political task of modern times—the inadmissibility of war, either nuclear or conventional—the USSR is effecting construction of the Armed Forces by applying the principle of sufficiency for defense. Our Fatherland is not striving to attain military superiority and it does not lay claims to great security, but it will not settle for a lesser security.

As long as our country has foes, Turkmen servicemen, the same as all Soviet servicemen, will continue to maintain a firm grip on their weapons and keep up a combat readiness that is sufficient to repel an outside attack launched against any Warsaw Pact member nation. This is dictated by the international situation; it is a requirement levied by the party and the people.

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Military Justice Officials Discuss Democracy, Law, and Army

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[Round-table discussion recorded by Col V. Klimov: "The Law and the Army"]

[Text] The legal protection of servicemen and criminal accountability for the commission of crimes, like the actual work of military investigators, prosecutors and judges, has until recently been among those subjects which were either entirely closed to the press or were open only by a small crack. The times are different today. If we give the name of a scoundrel who wore the officer's epaulets, it is doubtful that anyone will accuse us of slandering the entire military. On the contrary, it is clear to everyone that the military organism is strong and capable of cleansing itself of corruption on its own.

It is precisely this openness, inherent in the process of democratization of our entire state, which made it possible to conduct this round-table discussion. Participating in it were Lt Gen Justice Boris Sergeyevich Popov, main military procurator; Maj Gen Justice Leonid Mikhaylovich Zaika, first deputy main military prosecutor; Maj Gen Justice Vladimir Ilich Vasilyev, deputy main military prosecutor and chief of the Investigative Directorate; and Maj Gen Justice Anatoliy Timofeyevich Ukolov, deputy chief of the Administration of Military Tribunals of the USSR Ministry of Justice.

B. Popov: In the era of glasnost we have people attempting to discredit the Armed Forces.

[Correspondent] The restructuring occurring in the nation is inseparable from the strengthening of law and order. How is this affecting the campaign against violations of the law in the Armed Forces?

[B. Popov] The well known fact that "the people and the military are one" is true not just in positive respects, but also in negative ones. Crime was on the rise almost universally in the Armed Forces until 1985. There was an increase in heinous and gang crimes, and murders, rapes, robberies, violations of regulations governing relations among servicemen, beatings and evasions of military duty were committed. The number of victims of crimes was increasing, including civilian victims. All of this was one of the consequences of the period of stagnation.

The improvement of the society's life has been reflected substantially also in the morale of the military. The review of the state of military discipline by the Politburo of the CPSU CC and the implementation of measures to strengthen it played an extremely important role with respect to improving law and order in the military.

The party's decisions have been implemented in all areas. Commanders and political workers have put forth great effort. I can assure you that workers of the military prosecutor's office have not remained on the sideline. I believe that it would take up a great deal of space merely to enumerate the steps we have taken. But the main thing is the result. What is the result as of today?

The total number of crimes has dropped by almost 16%. The number of heinous crimes has fallen by 21%. The numbers for practically all types of crimes continue to decrease, including crimes undermining the combat readiness of the forces. These developments are being observed for the third year in a row, which gives us the basis for speaking of a crime reduction trend.

The main task set by the CPSU CC, however, that of fundamentally strengthening military discipline in the army and navy, is being accomplished slowly. Cases of evasion of military duty, nonregulation relations among servicemen and accidents involving military equipment are causing serious concern.

Glasnost is providing a great deal of help in the campaign against these negative occurrences. We have investigated all critical articles in the military press. According to the reports of military prosecutors handling these investigations, 48 people have been brought to disciplinary accountability, 16 have been held materially accountable, 17 have been brought to accountability by the party, and 8 officials have been removed from their positions. More than 17,000 rubles has been exacted from the guilty parties and gone into the state budget. All of those brought to accountability hold responsible positions.

I would add to this the fact that although we are revealing both felonies and misdemeanors, this does not mean that we ourselves are without sin. The procuracy, including the military procuracy, comes under the fire of criticism fairly frequently today. We accept it in the right spirit; it helps us to reveal both deficiencies and those

responsible for them. There are "irritations" in the coverage of juridical matters, to be sure. I believe that it would be beneficial for the journalists to consult with legal experts before publishing their articles.

Last year not a single crime was committed in agencies of the military prosecutor's office, the first time in 5 years. We had three cases of bribe-taking in 1987. Two of those who broke the law, Zadorozhnyy and Kashin, have now been convicted. The criminal case pertaining to Nesterev's bribe-taking is under investigation. The number of prosecutors and investigators brought to disciplinary accountability has been reduced considerably. We should have none, however. We have stepped up the training and methods work and begun taking more stringent steps with respect to the violators.

I would like to direct the readers' attention to this. The focus must be on explaining the law, a knowledge of which is absolutely essential to commanders and chiefs in their daily work. This includes those in charge of enterprises and establishments which have converted to economic accountability. This is presently a very important matter for the Armed Forces.

[Correspondent] How is the military legal system participating in the development of the legal reform?

[B. Popov] The Main Military Procuracy does not have legislative initiative. This is the prerogative of the General Procurator of the USSR. We therefore take all matters considered worthy of attention to it, and it goes to the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Have there been such instances? Yes. A recent example was the establishment of a commission under the local soviets to secure benefits for the fightingmen/internationals.

We are participating in the legal reform and as specialists we are members of the working group in the Commission on Legislative Proposals of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, in which we are taking part in the development of the Fundamentals of Criminal Law of the USSR and Union Republics and other legislative acts.

[Correspondent] What is the role of the military procurator at the garrison in the current situation? Are there conflicts with commanders in the exercise of oversight by the military procuracy? What are the main causes of the conflicts? How are they resolved?

[B. Popov] The main element in the military procurator's work at the garrison level is to effect monitoring by the military procuracy of observance of the laws in three areas: defense development, economic and social. Particular attention is given to monitoring the observance of the laws and military regulations by those in charge at the regimental, division and higher levels of military

command and control. When violations are detected the military procuracy demands that steps be taken to eliminate them and follows up to see what has been done.

Not everyone is pleased with the functioning of the military procuracies, particularly when the matter of disciplinary accountability for failure to observe the law comes up and the political organs are informed. An official who disagrees with such actions has the right to appeal them to the superior military procuracy. The disagreements are worked out by the superior procuracy, the command element and the political organs.

We have had no conflicts with the command element over the exercise of oversight by the procuracy. Those disagreements which have occurred, and they most frequently had to do with statistics, were not conflicts but our job, which probably does not always suit everyone.

I repeat, however, that these instances have not been conflicts.

[Correspondent] In the opinion of the military procuracy, what changes need to be made in the legislative acts and regulations for them to be used to enhance the status of the officer corps?

L. Zaika: Losses in the millions are frequently written off at state expense.

[L. Zaika] Draft general military regulations and the basic structure of the Law on Protecting the Socialist Homeland have been worked out. Draft statutes on the officer's assembly and courts of military honor have been approved. A working commission, which includes workers with the military procuracy, is considering changes and additions to the draft statute on the service of officers. The entire system of military legislation is presently being brought into conformity with the party's demands for orienting the defense development primarily toward qualitative parameters.

In the process we are fully supporting the line of securing the Soviet individual's legal protection. We are striving for more greater specificity and clarity in the establishment of a weekly day of rest for officers and in the consideration of the officer collective's opinion in deciding on promotions. In our opinion, it would be expedient to transfer a number of powers from higher agencies of command and control to those commanders and chiefs who bear full responsibility for the collectives subordinates to them.

The new version of the regulations reinforces the disciplinary authority of platoon and company commanders. The draft Fundamentals of Criminal Law precisely define the boundaries of responsibility for protecting state secrets. We have suggested that the court be authorized to apply only service accountability to those guilty

of certain crimes of indiscretion and less dangerous crimes. This would make it possible to retain the officers in the service and for them subsequently to restore their good name.

There is no point in enumerating the details of all the proposals being submitted by the Main Military Procuracy. Drafts are drafts, but we hope that our proposals will be taken into account for the final preparation of these legislative acts.

[Correspondent] The organization of a socialist legal state calls for significantly enhancing the role of the courts in the system of socialist democracy. To what degree has this affected the military tribunals? What new tasks do they face?

A. Ukolov: The fate of people depends in great part upon the court.

[A. Ukolov] Yes, indeed the role of the courts and their authority must be enhanced. They must become the main instrument for ensuring the observance of law and order. The fate of many people, the protection of their rights and interests and the observance of public order depend in great part upon the courts. It is a matter of strengthening guarantees of the democratic principles of legal procedure. And one of the key issues is that of ensuring the independence and inviolability of the courts and the possibility of administering the law objectively and dispassionately. This is precisely the purpose of the recent changes in the Constitution of the USSR, specifically the selection of judges not by citizens at their place of residence but by higher soviets of people's deputies. The judges of the military tribunals continue to be elected by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Judges will now be elected not for 5 years but for 10. And the term in office of people's assessors will be doubled to 5 years.

Passage of the Law on the Status of Judges in the USSR is expected soon. It will specify organizational guarantees for the independence of judges. These and other steps are designed to see that judges occupy their worthy place in the system of socialist democracy.

The prestige of the judges will not be achieved as a result of this alone, however. People make prestige. In the situation of the legal reform underway, those involved professionally in the administration of the law bear particular responsibility. The need for major improvement of the training of legal cadres, including the military judges, stems from this. Beginning in 1989 judges will be trained at the Military Institute from among officers who have served at least 3 years in the forces.

The improvement of preventive work and legal education is another direction in the restructuring of the functioning of military tribunals. This applies both to the organization of court procedures in the presence of

servicemen and the detection and elimination of preconditions for crimes, and to other forms of the work of judges, including their participation in universal legal education.

[Correspondent] A question about elections of people's assessors: Will soldiers and seamen be elected? They serve 2 or 3 years, after all.

[A. Ukolov] Yes, they will. The fact that they cannot perform their duties for the entire elected term, that is 5 years, is another issue.

[Correspondent] How is legislation designed to strengthen military discipline being improved?

V. Vasilyev: Certain violations of the law will be changed from felonies to misdemeanors.

[V. Vasilyev] Our discipline is based on awareness. The errors of the period of stagnation have also affected discipline in the military. As in the society, words have not always been backed up with action in the military. We have to consider the fact that alcohol abuse and drug addiction have spread, and numerous manifestations of materialism and indifference toward people have been observed in the society. And the forces have not escaped all of this.

Nor can we ignore the fact that certain people, exploiting democratization and glasnost, are attempting to give some sort of interpretation of their own to party principles. The prestige of the military service has been damaged considerably, of course. This has to be overcome. We cannot remain indifferent, when a prominent film director brags unashamedly and for all to hear that he was able to avoid the military service. It is therefore not surprising that two young students at the VGIK [All-Union State Institute of Cinematography], Sadykov and Sidorov, have evaded induction into the Armed Forces for a fifth time. Here we have the force of example. Eldar Ryazanov is the director of their studio at the institute.

Remember the violation of our air space by the West German flyer Rust. This was made possible in great part by the irresponsible performance of their immediate duties, sloppiness and violations of discipline of a number of servicemen. Two PVO [air defense] servicemen, Lt Col Karpets and Maj Chernykh, were held criminally accountable. Several other officers were relieved of criminal liability due to the specific circumstances.

The main paths for strengthening law and order in the army and navy lie in the general channel of practical restructuring measures. They include the revolutionary renewal of our nation's life, the development of public awareness and the achievement of a qualitatively new level of work on the part of the command element, political organs and military legal experts, including workers with the military procuracy.

Naturally, the law will have to be changed in order to legally back up the new tasks. Since industrial enterprises and agricultural collectives are being granted independence and the role of soviets at all levels is being enhanced, for example, we need precisely defined norms governing their duties in the defense area. The draft new regulations and other documents governing the military service are designed to stimulate the role of the public and enlarge the rights of junior commanders, including NCOs and petty officers. Certain violations of the law will be changed from felonies to misdemeanors, but liability for the commission of crimes with serious consequences will certainly be retained.

[Correspondent] What essential self-defense steps for protecting one's honor and dignity may a serviceman who encounters nonregulation relations apply?

[V. Vasilyev] Like any citizen, a serviceman has the right to take any self-defense action to prevent criminal assault upon himself or upon other servicemen, including the forcible infliction of harm upon the assailant. In these cases such actions are deemed legal. In assessing the kinds of counteraction used in such cases, it does not matter whether the victim could have run away or avoided the ridicule or humiliation. If the victim was unable to resist the offenders at the time, however, but takes reprisals against them subsequently, after a certain period of time has elapsed, he will be held criminally accountable.

[B. Popov] Unfortunately, our judicial experience has shown that an absolute majority of the victims and witnesses involved in such cases are passive. The victims do not defend themselves, and the witnesses do not come to their aid. This is very bad and very dangerous. We are talking about an active vital stance, a legal stance. The mass media discuss this very little, however. We must overcome our ignorance of the fact that the right to self-defense and to an active vital stance is backed up not just with political slogans, but also by the law.

[Correspondent] How does the military prosecutor's office assess the cover-up of nonregulation relations and other crimes?

[B. Popov] Very severely. And we have the full support of the Ministry of Defense leadership, even to the point of removing generals and officers from high positions and discharging them into the reserve. Cases of concealment of crimes are decreasing as a result of this stringent line. While we have support from above, however, the reaction sometimes varies at lower levels. In general, it needs to be said that concealed crimes, particularly those involving nonregulation relations, are ordinarily revealed by the military prosecutor's office. Not a single inspector from higher headquarters has yet revealed any such cases. This has to alarm us, of course.

We have the support of the Minister of Defense and the chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy in all matters, however. Here is an example which eloquently confirms this. Maj Gen Grubyy of the Carpathian Military District was recommended for discharge into the reserve for covering up crimes and for other infractions of the law.

[Correspondent] How dangerous are manifestations of so-called "national clannishness" (zemlyachestvo) and national prejudices? What preventive steps are being taken to forestall nationality-motivated crimes?

[A. Ukolov] There is some urgency with respect to this problem, a fact confirmed by the following. We surveyed several units in the Odessa Military District. A total of 23-25% of those surveyed stated that the problem of "national clannishness" and attendant nonregulation relations does exist. It has increased of late for reasons which are absolutely unclear. National relations in the country have been exacerbated. It should be candidly stated that we did not identify the problem as soon as we should have. We now have to get to the bottom of it. And some things have already been done.

Among other things, recommendations have been prepared for the military tribunals with respect to revealing the causes of "national clannishness," and instructions have been issued for stepping up the work of eliminating them.

[V. Vasilyev] At the same time crimes rooted in national soil—that is, those in which some sort of national discord is apparent—are isolated incidents. They account for 0.2-0.5% of the total number of crimes. A very small number. What kind of cases have we investigated? Jr Sgt Dzhavkharov, of Uzbek nationality, beat his Russian subordinates. What is more, he openly admitted that he could not stand Russians and that is why he beat them.

Here is another example.

Pvt Aldzhanov, a Kirghiz, beat his co-workers simply because he wanted to assert himself as a Moslem and placed himself above soldiers of other nationalities who do not profess the Muslim faith. Both servicemen were convicted.

We answer the question of "national clannishness" with statistics from criminal law. It disturbs us only because that 0.5% could grow if we do not take steps right now. And we are taking steps. We are engaged in preventive and forestalling work. For now the climate in the collective is healthy; a national problem does not exist. The disagreements which arise do not require criminal action.

[V. Vasilyev] With respect to total cases of embezzlement, let us frankly say that there were not many. Their ratio to cases of embezzlement in the civilian sector is

very low. The number of particularly large-scale thefts has been reduced in recent years: by 23.8% in 1986, 26.2% in 1987 and 46.7% in 1988 compared with 1985, for example. And the statistics for the last 5 years show that their portion of the total number of crimes fell from 2.3% to 1%. I refer to the embezzlement of money or materiel totalling 10,000 rubles or more. That is, to particularly large-scale thefts.

The participants in these crimes are ordinarily individuals in charge of materiel and service chiefs. They are rarely committed by individuals in managerial positions. The number of officers involved in these crimes has been reduced by almost half during the past 3 years. The number of warrant officers committing thefts has remained practically unchanged, to be sure, and the number of blue- and white-collar workers is now increasing. These are mainly military trade representatives.

Those stealing state property ordinarily all suffer the same consequences: criminal accountability. I shall cite just one example.

In 1986 Capt Lyabin, chief of the finance service in one of the military units of the Urals Military District, embezzled some money. Within a short period of time he bought an automobile and other valuable items. He was sentenced to 8 years in prison on 8 July of last year.

With respect to thefts committed by individuals in high positions, we presently have no examples of this. Fairly high-ranking people are sometimes taken to court, however. Several years ago, for example, Rear Adm Mormul (Northern Fleet) was convicted of systematically stealing military property together with a group of his subordinates. They were all brought to criminal accountability. Mormul himself was sentenced to 10 years in prison.

If we take the total monetary value of everything stolen in the Armed Forces for the year, the combined amount is considerably below that embezzled by individuals or groups of people in those criminal cases extensively publicized in the press. The former officials involved in the "Uzbek case," for example.

[L. Zaika] We must not forget, however, the fact that mismanagement, waste and negligence on the part of people in charge cause great material loss to the state. Millions of rubles in losses in capital construction and deliveries of inferior equipment and armaments to the forces are frequently written off at state expense. Agencies of the military procuracy have stepped up their campaign against these incidents significantly. Suffice it to say that several thousand officials have been held materially accountable for causing losses to the state at the recommendation of the military procuracies, and more than 27 million rubles has been recovered from them. Nor have we eliminated in their midst those who

like to acquire things at state expense, to build a little dacha, to repair an automobile or an apartment. They have to pay up after the military procurator intervenes, of course.

[Correspondent] What is the role of military justice in the rehabilitation of illegally repressed Soviet citizens, particularly servicemen?

[B. Popov] A very large one. Suffice it to say that 532,000 people have been rehabilitated in recent years. Today, or the wave of democratization, it should be noted that there are many people who would like to be rehabilitated even though they are real enemies of Soviet power. One sections in the Main Military Procuracy spends a great deal of time investigating each specific case to determine who was truly illegally repressed and who should not be rehabilitated.

[Correspondent] Officers have been insulted in some of our republics, particularly in the Baltic region. Moreover, the insult is inflicted not upon the officer as an individual but as a representative of the Armed Forces. What do we have in the draft legislation to provide legal protection for representatives of the Armed Forces?

[B. Popov] We have no legal protection for members of the Armed Forces. We need to think about that. If we look at world praxis, the armed forces are legally protected against such acts. Foreign countries have the concept of insult to the armed forces, which entails appropriate punishment.

Unfortunately, during the period of glasnost some people are attempting to discredit both the Armed Forces and the law-enforcement agencies. I believe the time has come to switch to an offensive against the ideological foe inside the nation. Law-enforcement agencies must be more active in submitting proposals for improving the law. They need to deal with the protection not just of each serviceman but of the Armed Forces as a whole.

[Correspondent] I want to thank you for the discussion and to express my hopes that we shall meet again to answer new questions from our readers.

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Response to Letter on Military VS. Nationality Loyalty

18010656 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
4 May 89 First Edition p 2

[Letter from Col V. Kulpinskas under the rubric "Open Letter to Lt Col Z. Vichis": "Why Force an Unlocked Door?"]

[Text] Dear Colleague: I read with interest your confessional article published in the Lithuanian youth newspaper KOMYAUNIMO TIESA on 23 February of this year under the heading "The Army Will Once Again Become

a School of Life for Us." A confession always wins people over, because it demands a certain civic courage. It is always intimate, so that discussing it is somehow awkward.

It was in great part this consideration which prevented me from sitting down and writing a letter to you, which stayed my pen. Your article bothered me greatly, however, and—albeit somewhat belatedly—I am motivated to speak out on matters pertaining to the officer's national self-awareness and individual aspects of military policy at the current stage of the restructuring.

Judging from the article, our lives have been similar in many ways. Furthermore, it seems that we are not just fellow countrymen, but also both Zemaiciai, from adjacent rayons: you are from Skuodasskiy Rayon; I am from Talshyaskiy. In Lithuania the Zemaiciai have a reputation for being very stubborn. I assume that our dialogue will not be based on this, however, but on the fact that we are both senior officers who are not indifferent to the fate of the honor and the good name of our army. And who are concerned, as Soviet officers, with continuing to be also Lithuanians, with retaining our national self-awareness.

I am in total agreement with you that (to cite your own words from the article) "the national principle, in my opinion, should be the starting point for developing patriotism." But the word "point" is hardly appropriate. In my opinion, it is too narrow and limited. Would it not be better to call this principle the source, because the national sense should also nurture moral qualities. And are the individual's social and political position and his understanding of the basic values selected by the society not important? Without all of this, it seems to me, the national can turn into the nationalistic, with manifestations of egotism, national delimitation and cliquishness.

You go on to write; "Without it (that is, the national basis—V.K.) no sort of internationalism is possible. I have in mind general assimilation" (?) I am sorry, Zigmantas, but the logic escapes me. We have a clear substitution of concepts: assimilation of nations for internationalism (that is, the dissolution of one, small nation within the mass of another, large one. Incidentally, I have encountered this device—the substitution of concepts—unfortunately, in other articles of yours). Does internationalism really amount to the swallowing up and dissolution of nations, the nullifying of national feelings? In my opinion, these are totally different concepts.

Let us go on: "It is not just the Lithuanians, but others as well, who are being assimilated," you write. "We do not find very many officers of the small peoples in the Soviet military who would not like to serve in their own republic. A person, no matter who, without a homeland is nobody"! Let us stop there for now. Your choice and mine are very similar, Zigmantas. Like you, I entered a military school (even though I dreamed of journalism and literature from childhood) more out of material

considerations—or more precisely, because of material difficulties: I could not expect any help from my parents (there were seven children in the family, and my father, a forestry worker, earned 250 "old" rubles a month), and I wanted to be independent.

We made the choice ourselves. We knew very well what an officer's career held for us. So whom can we blame now for the fact that we happened to serve far from our native parts, that our children graduated from Russian schools and VUZs? In selecting a career as a cadre serviceman, we had to resolve also the following question: Can I continue to be a Lithuanian, and is that important or all the same to me? If it is important, how will I be able to retain my ties with my native land, with its cultural and spiritual life?

Incidentally, it is not just the military who make this choice. I know Lithuanians who have voluntarily gone to the Far North, to Tyumen or Urengoy to work and have settled there permanently. They made their choice; it suited them. And those whom it did not suit, who returned or did not go there in the first place, were not forced to do so, after all. I even know of a marriage which broke up because of this: the wife and son returned to Lithuania (they were unable to put down roots there), while the father first came back and then returned to Vorkuta. He apparently could not live elsewhere.

A choice is always to some degree a compromise, with reciprocal commitments. I feel that all people choosing a place of work and residence in another republic must assume those commitments. I do not believe that a native of Vologda who has moved to Vilnius, Riga or Tallin has the right to demand that his life here be exactly as it was in the Vologda area. And we who have chosen the officer's career hardly have the right to complain about being separated from our native parts. On the other hand, no one has forbidden us Lithuanian officers to retain our language, to read Lithuanian periodicals and literature, to retain ties with our "small" homeland. Did anyone oppress us, not approve of our longing for our own things, things Lithuanian? There was nothing of the kind! I know that very well from my own situation. I constantly subscribed to Lithuanian magazines and newspapers. When I requested it, my family would buy new works of literature and other books for me, which I picked up when I came home on leave. I set myself the goal of graduating precisely from Vilnius State University, and did so. Approximately half of the books in my home library are in Lithuanian. Our children know the Lithuanian language, even though they graduated from Russian educational institutions. They can write a postcard or a decent letter in Lithuanian.

Incidentally, we speak Lithuanian at home. I have never been inhibited from doing this, and no one has reproached me for it. In general, I have never experienced even the slightest oppression or even a hint of ill will on the part of Russians or members of other nations.

On the contrary, I have perceived respect and approval for my "Lithuanianism." And so, Zigmantas, why the moaning about assimilation?

You write: "Serving far from Lithuania, we lose our national self-respect. It is not surprising that Russians laugh when two Lithuanians speaking their native language utter Russian oaths." I am sorry, Zigmantas, but all of this depends upon the individual himself. I would say that it is all a result of intellectual indifference and laziness.

I would ask you, where did Jonas Basanavichus, patriarch of our Lithuanian nation, and such great and luminous figures as Vintsas, Kudirka, Jonas Mackylis-Mayoronis, Antanas Baranauskas, Jonas Yablonskis and others study and spend most of their lives? Not in Lithuania! They received their education mainly in Russia, moreover—and I particularly stress this—in czarist Russia. They not only succeeded in remaining Lithuanians, however, but even in rousing their nation, uplifting it and leading it. And what about Vintsas Petaris, author of the first Lithuanian historical novel "Altimantas"? He spent all of his life in the Russian interior, now known as the Nonchernozem (in the city of Ustyuzhna), and visited Lithuania only on vacations. And he was able not only to preserve that national foundation, but also to delve deeply into the history of Lithuania, to produce an enormous literary work. And here you have them "uttering Russian oaths"! As though there were nothing better to adopt from the Russian language!

Unfortunately, Zigmantas, I have seen in a Lithuanian family (husband and wife are Lithuanian) the father speaking Russian with his daughter in the evening only because, you see, it was difficult for him "to switch" to his native language after work. Perhaps this is a result of intrigues of "great-power chauvinism," a product of forced assimilation?

And now permit me to move on to some purely military matters, specifically the national-territorial principle for manning the Soviet Armed Forces and national military formations currently undergoing extensive debate. You have discussed these, Zigmantas, repeatedly in Lithuania's press, defending the right of each republic to establish its own national army. It is my profound conviction that switching to this principle right now would be premature and inexpedient, because it would negatively affect the combat readiness of the Armed Forces of the USSR and the security of our state.

It would be contrary to dialectics, of course, to state that the current procedure for performing military service and manning our Armed Forces is unshakeable and viable for all times. The same as it would be to try to demonstrate that the territorial militia principle can never be acceptable anywhere, under any circumstances. Particularly since we know that it was used for a fairly long time in the Soviet Union. It is a matter of the

inadmissibility of the territorial principle right now, at the current stage of historical development, when the real danger of war has not yet been eliminated, when there are powerful opposing military groupings, when there are enormous stockpiles of nuclear missiles and other offensive weapons ready for use. We know that the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles affects less than 5% of the entire nuclear missile capability of the two world powers, the USSR and the USA. So that basing far-ranging plans, maintaining pacifist illusions and particularly, fracturing our united defensive shield and scattering our army among national barracks right now would be a precipitate act, to put it mildly. You avoid these issues, Zigmars.

I would note that V.I. Lenin, while recognizing the right of the Union republics to political and economic sovereignty, at the same time invariably stressed the fact that matters of defense and foreign policy absolutely must remain a Union prerogative and be decided on a Union scale. Precisely our joint defense and common foreign policy were one of the most important prerequisites for the establishment of the Union of SSRs.

And one last thing. You, Zigmars, and many others consider the establishment of national military formations to be a panacea for all problems, including "non-regulation relations." Is the shameful denigration of juniors by elders not flourishing at certain boarding schools and SPTU [secondary vocational and technical schools], even though the group is ordinarily composed of natives of a single republic? It is obviously not a matter of national makeup. Weeds will take over any uncultivated field. When the indoctrinal work is neglected, negative, abnormal developments will manifest themselves sooner or later in any collective, whether it be nationally homogeneous or mixed.

In your article in KOMYUNIMO TIESA, Zigmars, you state the following: "Dumping the problems on the civilian society is not a solution, in my opinion." I agree with you completely. Order must be instilled in the army not by the public but by us officers, each at his own station. You and I, all of us—from the platoon commander to the USSR minister of defense. And is this not what we are called upon to do by the party Central Committee, the government and the higher military leadership? So what is wrong? Why force an open door and call for us not to be forbidden to do what we are obligated to do by our service duty and by the dictates of our conscience?

GLAVPU Center for Opinion Polling of Military Personnel Discussed
18010582 Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian 6 May 89 p 2

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel A. Khromov: "The Concerns of a Draftee"]

[Text] Under the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy [GLAVPU] functions the Center for the Study of Public Opinion of Military Personnel.

The center analyzes social processes occurring in the Army and Navy and the dynamics of qualitative characteristics of staff and draftees; it researches the effectiveness of military activity, especially under conditions of alert status, combat training, and extreme situations (Chernobyl, the earthquake in Armenia); it brings to light reasons and conditions for the emergence of positive and negative phenomena and trends in multi-ethnic military units; and it develops on this basis the appropriate practical recommendations for commanders and political workers.

Over the short duration of its existence the center has already conducted several important polls concerning the problems of higher service schools, and concerning the 1989 draftee. For example, in the course of the program "draftee-89" a sociological poll revealed that the majority of youths (82 percent) maintain a firm orientation towards the necessity of defending the achievements of socialism. With regard to the servicemen fulfilling their duty in the Republic of Afghanistan, the overwhelming majority of draftees (95 percent) expressed their respect for them and consider them heroes. One-fourth of those polled declared that they would like to attend the school for soldier-internationalists.

It is also important to emphasize the character of the draftees' answers to the question "What do you hope to gain for yourself from your service in the Army?" The majority of those polled believe that service in the Army will enable them to cultivate in themselves such qualities as courage, bravery, and resoluteness. Many express the hope that in the Army they will become physically stronger and will learn to love the Motherland better and defend it more steadfastly. Parents of future soldiers expressed the widespread opinion (97 percent) that the Army and Navy are important and play a prominent educational role.

In a related matter, it was also interesting to observe what troubles young people most of all in connection with conscription into the Army. The poll showed that concerns about separation from family and friends rank first, while the austere army life and the great physical demands appear afterward. We note that the so-called dedovshchina worries draftees least of all.

In the course of further work the center plans to conduct a series of investigations along the most varied lines, including problems of formulating standards of inter-ethnic relations and social justice in military service, and a study of the Army's role and prestige in society.

Preferential Treatment of Minority Officer Candidates
18010674 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 May 89 First Edition p 1

[Letter to editors from L. Kalininchenko, G. Bektamirova, A. Zinchenko (20 signatures in all): "Why This Selectivity?"]

[Text] Respected editors:

We are teachers at the Republic Special Boarding School imeni 60th Anniversary of the Communist Party of Kirghizia with intensive Russian-language studies and military physical education. The enrollment at special schools is made up of 85% students from the youth of the indigenous nationality and 15% members of other nationalities. During the 3 years of training we do not divide our students up according to nationality, of course. We educate them in a spirit of equality, fraternity and international unity.

Graduation day arrives, however, and some of them immediately encounter signs of inequality based precisely on national origin. Graduates at the special schools from the indigenous nationalities are enrolled at military schools without taking the exams. The other 15% must take the exams even if they have been far better students than their comrades. They too have the special privilege of noncompetitive enrollment, but we would agree that this is not the equivalent of the former benefit.

This is the kind of selectivity we have. Students live and study together, wear the same uniform, and everything is equal, but after graduation some of them do not have an "equal opportunity" to enter a military school and become an officer. This is hardly justified. We want to know the legal basis for this provision. And how is it commensurate with the principles of equal rights and duties for all of our country's nations and ethnic groups? We are asked such questions by the students, and we cannot give them an intelligible answer.

Soldiers' Lack of Annual Leave Called 'Unconstitutional'

18010680a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
23 May 89 First Edition p 1

[Letter by Col Internal Service V. Kutushev, doctor of juridical sciences, professor, chief of Khabarovsk Higher School of USSR MVD: "A Time of Real Movements"]

[Text] The new parliament which we just formed should begin its work by creating laws guaranteeing human rights and freedoms. You will agree that we often are defenseless before the arbitrary rule of bureaucrats, before consumer services, and before criminal elements. A contemptuous attitude toward human rights and toward the law, which found its extreme expression in the Stalinist repressions and which flourished in the period of stagnation, still is one of the characteristic features of our social awareness. Unfortunately we have not preserved the equality of all before the law as proclaimed by the Revolution or the priority of law about which Lenin spoke.

I will cite a simple example. Article 41 of the USSR Constitution proclaims that all USSR citizens have the right to time off and to annual paid vacations. Pay

attention: all USSR citizens. The Basic Law makes no exceptions. Despite this, many of our first-term servicemen do not have such vacations.

A soldier's labor is difficult labor. I say this from first-hand knowledge as I myself served three years compulsory service. Depriving a soldier of leave is an unconstitutional, antihumane measure. I am convinced that a positive resolution of the issue would not reflect on Armed Forces combat readiness; to the contrary, it would strengthen the soldiers' morale and contribute to improved educational work among servicemen.

I await real movements from the 1st Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR in the work of creating a rule-of-law state in which supremacy of the law will triumph.

Deputies Should Avoid 'Mechanical Approach' to Defense Budget Cuts

18010680b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
23 May 89 First Edition p 1

[Letter by Maj I. Surkov, deputy battalion commander for political affairs, Leningrad: "Are We That Rich?"]

[Text] Today the demand to revise Army and Navy financing in the direction of a reduction of budget funds sounds more and more often over radio and television and from the pages of newspapers. While recognizing the need for redistributing these expenditures within limits of reasonable sufficiency, at the same time a person falls to thinking: Are we that well supplied with everything necessary for maintaining combat readiness at the proper level? In fact it is no secret that units (especially air defense, air force and other units) constantly experience a shortage of spare parts, electronic units, all kinds of tools and much more, without which equipment simply becomes noncombat-ready.

It would appear that it is not a mechanical approach toward reducing the military budget that is needed. It would be justified to redistribute funds within the budget for improving the qualitative parameters of equipment and eliminating the Army's burning social problems. The fact is that thousands on thousands of our officers and warrant officers are crowded into private apartments. If the budget is simply reduced, however, the Army's housing situation will be aggravated even more and social problems just will remain unresolved.

It is my deep conviction, which is also based on the opinion of my colleagues, that the question of the military budget must be discussed at the upcoming Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR only after a weighed evaluation of all Army and Navy needs. The hearts of the people's deputies cannot help but ache for that holy of holies, reliable defense of the country against possible external aggression.

Readers Discuss 'Social Significance of Military Service'

Editorial Commentary

*18010680c Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
23 May 89 First Edition p 2*

[Editorial comment by under rubric "Openly About a Sore Subject": "We Will be Beyond Reproach"]

[Text] Lately the editorial mail has contained more and more letters from officers and warrant officers of widely varied ages and official positions which touch on many acute questions of the social significance of military labor. People are trying to understand just what place the Army and the profession of defender of the Motherland hold in public awareness today, and what the reasons are for certain distortions which occur here. The subject is very acute and it is not surprising that many letters are written very emotionally and at times even clearly under the effect of resentment. We decided to acquaint readers with two such letters which reveal two very characteristic positions.

Criticism of Military Dismaying

*18010680c Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
23 May 89 First Edition p 2*

[Letter by Capt I. Chursin: "Perhaps Get Out?"]

[Text] Dear Editors! I will tell you how things spilled over. I wanted to have my say for too long; then recently I watched the program "Viewpoint," where writer V. Vasilyev told about the Tbilisi events, and I decided that we military cannot be silent. Judging from various kinds of articles appearing in many newspapers, all the very worst is concentrated in the Army. Allegedly we do not engage in combat training, discipline has gone to pot, and mothers fear to entrust their sons to us. And now, after the events in Georgia, generally what is to be done? At least take off the uniform and give up one's officer profession as a bad job. I automatically ask myself: Perhaps in fact I should leave the service? The fact is, it is impossible to ignore how the prestige of military service drops more and more over the years.

Did you see the smart cooperator-dealer grinning behind the wheel of his personal Volga as he waited for the road in front of him to be clear of the formation of soldiers led by an officer? Did you have occasion to observe how a character in shorts and a major's shoulderboards came out in an entertainment show in the city park and the master of ceremonies commented that this was "a Soviet officer relaxing"? Did you hear the bawdy anecdotes about officers' wives? Or about commanders or generals playing the fools in trying to teach creativeness to the creative intelligentsia? Add to this the opinion (which did not arise without the press) that military people are shovelling in the money, and it will become understandable why we try not to appear in uniform today on the streets or in public places, not to mention on leave.

But what are we guilty of to be ashamed of ourselves? For example, what am I, who served three years right at the border, at the world's end, and who spent two years in Afghanistan, guilty of? Like all my officer and warrant officer friends, I took the deprivations, the straining of every nerve, and the need to go into battle as being proper. What is my friend Aleksandr Minovskiy, who still has not recovered from a concussion, guilty of? Or other lads who have not known war, but who know what military service is? From whence comes our absurd persecution (I find no other word to define all the attacks against the military)?

No, we do not demand any special attitude. We do not demand wealth. We fully answer for our personal omissions. An officer is "beaten" for them even without the press, and rather painfully. What more can the printed word do if the workday for the absolute majority of us is 12-16 hours, reassignment orders come before your turn for an apartment approaches, and the pay... Among themselves officers at times say: "You don't even serve for thanks."

We perform our duty everywhere an order takes us. Something irreparable happened in Tbilisi. An objective investigation has not yet been completed, but the culprits already have been determined and have been publicized throughout the country and other countries: the cruel Soviet soldier who knows no mercy. And officers are the same.

On the other hand, look how negligibly little has been told about the heroism of soldiers during the earthquake in Armenia. And do people know any more about the painful labor of Army subunits in mopping up rail and other disasters? Not everything has been told about the military at Chernobyl or about heroism in Afghanistan.

Lately I have been asking myself a question more and more often. Consciously or not, pinpricks or rejoinders are addressed to the Army and to us, or there is a hint of clear hostility. I am not even talking about those publications where we are quite specifically called an antiprestroyka force. Why does no one ask themselves: What blood might have been spilled in Armenia, in Azerbaijan and in Nagornyy Karabakh had our soldiers and officers not been there? How many people would have been left beneath the rubble of Leninakan, Spitak and Stepanavan? And they could ask much more if an objective approach were taken to the Army.

We may not deserve anything else, but we military deserve objectivity. Meanwhile, there is less and less desire to serve and less and less patience and nerves to do the work.

From the Editors. How can this letter be answered? Reassure the author? Try to dispel his doubts and anxiety?

But another reader sent a letter as if to elaborate on the subject raised by Capt Chursin.

Criticism Stems From Ignorance
18010680c Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
23 May 89 First Edition p 2

[Letter by Maj O. Plotnikov: "That Which is Slanderous Will Subside"]

[Text] As is probably true of everyone in the military, I have been especially interested in the Army theme in our press for several years now. Many articles are devoted to the Army. Not everyone will understand at once what kind of articles these are, good or bad, "happy or sad," but the general tone of many articles, especially in youth publications, is such that after reading them the mood of officers and men, fathers and mothers remains, let us say, melancholic. Unfortunately, for a long time I have not encountered a genuine, truthful, profound article about the Army in such publications as YUNOST, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, ROVESNIK or OGONEK. The majority leave an impression of gloom.

Here is what I would like to say. Today there is a consolidation of the country's creative forces for enormous revolutionary work aimed at the renewal and strengthening of socialism. We will not accept another way. The time has come for democratism in the course of work itself, including in the Army. Those who write about today's Army, however, often adhere to a note used for meetings, and often simply to a hysterical note far from true democratism. Excuse me for saying so, but many volunteers have appeared to discuss "the breakdown in the Army," and from among people who are ill-versed in this matter, to put it mildly.

I remember just one point, the recent words of a well-known bard which resounded about Army problems: "The officers are at fault for everything." I have nothing against the singer. I have due respect for his trips to Afghanistan, but his abilities to analyze the cause-and-effect relationship clearly let him down here. These words hurt not only me, but also the memory of my grandfather, who fell during the liberation of the Baltic; the memory of my father, who spent a quarter-century in garrisons; my mother, who gave her youth to those garrisons; and of course, my wife, who married a person who consciously chose a difficult future as an officer.

I pondered long over such attacks and it must be said that at some point in time they no longer hurt me as they did before. I realized that they describe more not the Army, but the person who tells about it. We know the service and everything around it best of all, and so one has to personally believe one's own impressions about the Army: not those borrowed, but those experienced. So that I believe one must react calmly to any "evil" publications. I am convinced that it is not becoming of us, who are able to control ourselves even in a combat situation, to give in to emotions. We have to do our jobs, and do them calmly, well, and conscientiously. That which is slanderous will subside. Even now, in fact, one

can clearly see who is skimming the top of Army deficiencies, of which we really have a great deal, and who wants to help the Army by word and deed.

I wish to conclude with Lenin's words, which I have not read in a single present-day article about the Army: "Let everyone who is aware of his or her political responsibility, who grieves over the deficiencies of our Army, go into the ranks and files, . . . let everyone work within the military organization for its improvement—anyone can find a place for himself . . . according to his abilities."

It stands to reason that I did not quote these words to call on someone to go serve in the Army, but there is something to think about here.

Lizichev on 70th Anniversary of Main Political Directorate

18010593 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
29 May 89 Second Edition p 3

[Article by General of the Army A. Lizichev, Chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate: "Commissars on the Line: On the 70th Anniversary of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate"]

[Text] Seventy years ago in May 1919, the Republic's Revvoyensovet [Revolutionary Military Council] Political Directorate was formed on the initiative of V.I. Lenin. Later on, it was transformed into the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate. The formation of a unified system of leading party agencies within the Armed Forces was completed through the establishment of a central military-political agency.

Having established the Political Directorate, the Party concentrated the leadership for Armed Forces-wide party political work in this agency. Party ties with the masses of servicemen and rallying them around the Central Committee was implemented through party and Komsomol organizations, through the Revvoyensovet's PU [Political Directorate] political workers, and through a far-flung network of political agencies. Thus, the Party's military policy was made a reality.

The seventy year history of the Army and Navy's political agencies is evidence that: the work they carry out is a distinctive additional type of weapon which is terrifying for any of our enemies. The human factor and the man in uniform himself, as V.I. Lenin said, "the man with the rifle," his moral, political, and ethical nature, his combat skill, his patriotism and internationalism, his class self-consciousness and his loyalty to his constitutional military duty, really always was and will be the constant, main condition for improving the Armed Forces. "Monitor political work..." and "Do not lessen political work...", V.I. Lenin demanded, insisted, and warned in his time.

In our time when the Army and Navy are carrying out, together with society, a revolutionary transition to their qualitatively new state, the role of party political work is greatly increasing. This is an objective necessity flowing from the appropriateness of the human factor's increased role in perestroika. Today the Army, as never before, needs soldiers and sailors, officers and generals who are staunchly dedicated to socialism. And moreover, those who are active, searching, and know how to live, work, and serve under conditions of democracy and glasnost and at the same time within the harsh limits of command by one man, iron military discipline, and in an atmosphere of the highest social responsibility for themselves and the nation.

Perestroika, the new political thinking, and the realization in practice of the tenets of the defensive military doctrine have substantially accentuated the political agencies' task—to take the lead. To not only be messengers of these processes in Army and Navy life, but along with military councils and commanders—to be their architects and organizers.

For seven decades, the Soviet Army and Navy's political agencies together with military councils and commanders, under the leadership of the Party's Central Committee, have been increasing combat readiness of troops and naval forces, consolidating the Army's vital ties with the people, increasing organizational strengths and discipline, and teaching servicemen in the spirit of Soviet patriotism, friendship of the peoples of the USSR, and socialist internationalism.

And today, in the course of perestroika, political agencies are doing everything necessary so that the Party's leading role in strengthening the Armed Forces constantly increases. They are inspiring and organizing Army and Navy personnel for attainment of new qualitative indicators in combat improvements and are firmly maintaining the Party position on further strengthening of command by one man—the underlying principle of constructing and leading an Army of a new type and decisively reforming the style and methods of its operation so that it can be an example of democratic organization and live according to those laws which have been placed at the base of perestroika and actively oppose the command leadership method of party political work, conservatism, inertia, demagogic, and administration by decree.

For example, last year political agencies did not only account for their work but also received an evaluation of their work as it is being done at local party agency party conferences. Some people came out against this innovation. There were even doubts among the GlavPUR [Main Political Directorate of the Revvoyensovet] itself. However, we did it and we were not mistaken. Many political agencies came out of the last report-back election campaign as if cleansed, stronger, and more industrious.

I recently had the opportunity to visit many garrisons of the Far Eastern, Transbaykal, Belorussian, and Moscow Military Districts, the Pacific Ocean Fleet, and the Group of Soviet Forces Germany. It became quite clear to me: Communists and personnel are fervently supporting the line toward democratization of the inner workings of political agencies and the improvement of party and political work. Another thing was noticeable, too: People are troubled by where perestroika is going and what new forms and methods have commissars been employing for creating a healthy moral and political atmosphere in military units and deepening the process of democratization and the development of glasnost? Are they taking total responsibility for making the service a genuine school of patriotism and internationalism for each serviceman? Are they concerned that the atmosphere of inter-party life should be determined by adherence to principle, responsibility, party fellowship, exactingness, and, at the same time, a deferential attitude toward people?

I will tell you frankly that these are difficult questions. We need to answer them, and more importantly, we need to resolve them. The Army and Navy have enormous party potential: There are more than one million communists, two-thirds of whom are officers, and approximately 40,000 primary party organizations. The last report-back election campaign showed increased demands on Army and Navy communists. The names of more than 50,000 CPSU members, about whom the party organizations had allegations, are mentioned in the adopted resolutions alone (I will say for information purposes this is 15 times more than in the report-back election campaign on the eve of the 27th Party Congress). Communists expressed 320,000 critical observations and suggestions. In short, the demands became more specific and the effectiveness of party political work has been increased.

Military councils, political agencies, commanders, and party and Komsomol organizations are loading a cartridge clip of primary matters, if it can be expressed that way, with Leninist ideas, concepts, and recommendations affecting the combat readiness of troops and naval forces and demanding "No burst of emotion, no appeal, and no combat slogan, but prolonged, intense, stubborn, and disciplined work on a mass scale."

Another complicated issue is military discipline. What is the main thing here? By what paths do we go to raise its level to the height of perestroika's demands? We started by attempting to change the very approaches to the problem of strengthening it, to transfer the center of gravity to individual work with man, to achieve not ostentatious, but leaders' vigorous spiritual closeness to their subordinates, and to create duty conditions, life styles, and relaxation for all personnel in accordance with the regulations.

As a result, a trend toward strengthening discipline has been noted. However, a radical turning point in the state

of discipline has not yet occurred. We have not succeeded in ending disgraceful occurrences such as inter-relations not in accordance with regulations and evasion of military service. In the Army and Navy, we are still encountering cases of callousness, lack of knowledge of people, and an inability to assist them in a timely manner during difficult living situations.

We are stringently disciplining commanders and political workers who are not taking decisive actions to suppress abnormal phenomena, right up to discharge from the Armed Forces and expulsion from the Party or Komsomol. I will give an example: Now former Regimental Commander Lieutenant Colonel I. Imschinov and his Deputy for Political Affairs Lt Col A. Zlobin had already been invited to the Main Political Directorate. Both had not commanded military units for one year. But their explanations were so feeble regarding the fact that *dedovshchina* [unwarranted hazing of subordinates] still persists in the regiment and, instead of a fierce struggle with it, they embarked on the path of covering up these cases.

Both leaders were severely punished. But, I think that this is not the matter. The social roots of "dedovshchina," in my view, are being cut not only and not so much in Army or Navy reality. This is a throw back to the years of stagnation. A generation is still even now entering the Army which to some degree has already acquainted itself with the senior serviceman's dictates and it has submitted to the negative influence of the "leaders." Due to the complexities of the demographic situation in the nation and in the Armed Forces at the present time, we are still drafting young people who have [criminal] convictions, physical and even mental deficiencies, and "who have been acquainted" with drugs and alcohol.

But they really are our people! We are responsible to the people and to our party conscience for them. Therefore, we will not blame anyone but we will work. As we say in the Army, we will get this man in order! Stubbornly, persistently!

Or take, for example, the problem of inter-ethnic [mezhnatsionalnyye] relations. It would not be true if I said that we in the GlavPUR are totally satisfied with work on inter-ethnic education. Let me say it this way—this would mean closing our eyes to problems which still exist. But the main thing also is that inter-ethnic military units are maintaining their integrity, stability, and are carrying out their assigned missions.

The Army was, is, and will be a school of inter-ethnic education. And we are intensifying efforts in this matter. Here are only a few specific steps. Today, officers and young commanders are directed to know the traditions, customs, and peculiarities of the national psychology of subordinate soldiers and sailors. Inter-ethnic relations commissions have been established under the GlavPUR and under all political agencies and party committees. In

virtually every unit, we are subscribing to newspapers and magazines from those union and autonomous republics where youth have been conscripted. Servicemen are being educated in the spirit of respect of each nation's and nationality's traditions. But even here we still must hasten, and this is the most vital thing, to place each soldier and sailor in equal conditions and only real results in duty must become the evaluation criteria of their work everywhere.

Army and Navy political agencies have taken a firm course toward individualization of political educational work and are overcoming philosophy, formalism, the notorious gross output approach, and enthusiasm through mass measures in this work. Political directorate inspector and instructor staffs of military districts, groups of forces and fleets, army and division political departments are currently working in units and on ships for up to 60-70 percent of their work time, giving priority to working directly with people, training them, [improving] their living conditions, and introducing the progressive experience of *perestroika*.

For example, the newspaper *PRAVDA* has frequently recalled Major General A. Zakharov on its pages. Maj Gen Zakharov, former head of the political department of the 40th Army and comrade-in-arms of Army Commander B. Gromov, was recently slain in Afghanistan. This political worker literally did not "hide" from the troops. In accordance with his duties, he could even have carried out his mission in his office. However, this man walked, drove, and flew where there was a great deal of dangerous military activity and where people and successes, death and wounds were quite near.

We bow our heads in memory of Captain First Class T. Burkulakov, political section chief of a nuclear submarine division. All of us were touched by the selflessness of the Northern Fleet seamen from the submarine *Komsomolets*. T. Burkulakov manifested enormous courage in the struggle to save people and the boat. The commissar did not have to go on such a cruise. But he went... and died, having carried out his military and party duties until the end...

Just how can the moral, political, and psychological troop training system be improved? As we know, it is provided by party political work assets and methods to a decisive degree. I will list some figures. During two years of service, each soldier and sailor undergoes a political training and political information course. It is 500 hours in duration. Today a television and a radio is issued for each 20-25 servicemen. The total circulation of military newspapers totals 6.5 million copies per day. Approximately 7,000 officer and enlisted clubs, 8,000 libraries with a book stock of over 125 million volumes, 750 museums, 44 professional song and dance ensembles, seven of "our" dramatic theaters, 42 movie bases, and 187 movie rental centers which have more than 330,000 copies of artistic films and 280,000 documentary and popular science films are in operation. Practically the

entire army and the whole fleet are surrounded by television, including groups of Soviet forces abroad and ships on combat duty in the World's oceans.

This is, as they say, a solid base. However, we must attain a maximum return from it and include each military man in perestroika. The greatest difficulty is in the thinking and psychology which was formed in previous years. And therefore, we must more decisively saturate the political insurance of combat readiness, figuratively speaking, with the oxygen of perestroika. And primarily through democratization of Army and Navy life.

Unfortunately, the desire to carry out new missions through old methods and approaches still lives in the Army and Navy. Certain military councils, political agencies, yes and party committees have still not to this day acquired the necessary warrior-like qualities and frequently reconcile themselves with shortcomings in the military and, instead of taking decisive action, as usual they await instructions from above. In many units and on ships, the activities of primary party organizations is not nearly equal to the times they are experiencing.

We are still faced with overcoming the organizational and ideological passivity of a whole number of primary political agencies (political departments of divisions and brigades). We will strive to increase their responsibility for specific and daily leadership of party and Komsomol organizations and attain an avant-garde role for each communist and Komsomol member in military training, duty, and behavior.

We have now taken a course toward democratization of all work with command and political personnel. The role of unit agencies, military councils, political departments, party committees, and party bureaus has been increased and their participation has been broadened in selection, assignment, promotion and commendation of officers, warrant officers, and naval warrant officers. The new institution of efficiency reports has been established for command and political personnel who are constantly conducting efficiency report commissions in units and on ships.

The attitude of personnel toward perestroika, not in words but in deeds, is becoming a main criteria of personnel evaluation. The higher the position, the greater the demand. During the last two to three years, a number of leading workers, including more than a 100 political department chiefs, have been relieved of duty for failures in work, low moral qualities, and isolation from people. A significant renewal has occurred among the officer corps. Almost 50 percent of USSR Ministry of Defense central agency personnel have been replaced.

A fundamentally new moral and political atmosphere is now being created in the Army and Navy. I will only point out one case: If servicemen were nominated to the deputy corps only by generals and marshals during past

elections to the Supreme Soviet, today almost half of the military deputies are young and senior officers serving in the Soviet Army. One officer candidate was elected deputy. Perestroika has put them forward into the major political arena.

Today the Army has ceased being, as they say, a "closed" zone. Constructive criticism of specific shortcomings in Army life by the media is being perceived with understanding in the Army lecture hall. Unfortunately, certain newspaper articles and radio and television programs provide superficial, frequently are not objective, and often incompetent appraisals of the processes of perestroika which are occurring within the Armed Forces and even propose a transition to a professional mercenary army, national military formations, or a militia and territorial system of formations and training.

All of us are realists. Rejecting incompetence and placid complacency, the overwhelming majority of military communists (we receive dozens and hundreds of letters on this theme daily) say: The Army must be personnel educated in the spirit of patriotism and friendship of the peoples of the USSR and proletarian internationalism and replenished on the basis of military obligation and extraterritorial conduct of duty, an Army closely tied to the people and dedicated to their interests and closely united around the CPSU, its Central Committee, and the Soviet government.

Along with the USSR Minister of Defense and the Armed Forces General Staff, the Main Political Directorate bears total responsibility for the course of perestroika in the Army and Navy. Today new approaches are required from it in the political, military, social, and spiritual spheres, in the struggle with shortcomings in combat readiness and troop training, manifestation of bureaucratism in the management sphere, lack of discipline, and irresponsibility.

We have lost and continue to lose much because we have not been able to unfetter the initiative, creativity, and independence of a portion of military cadre and personnel. It is precisely this that I see as the largest, most difficult, but also the most important GlavPUR task in the whole restructuring of party and political work in the Army and Navy.

This is why we are posing the question about the political worker's personality in a new way, as a man and a communist who must be more closely associated with officers, soldiers, and sailors. We are saying: A political worker is both a duty and a position. I would like to add: A political worker is a party character and a party will. Unfortunately, there are still dark holes in our lives and they are also on the honor of certain servicemen. The more vivid and profound the light of the political worker's and commissar's personal example is, the more penetrating and aggressive party work must be, and the more exacting the demand on the political worker.

Much has been done during four years of perestroika in the Army and Navy. I judge this by comparing combat and mobilization readiness, combat training, and the political and moral condition of personnel of today with those which existed prior to April, 1985. Nevertheless, too little has been done if you compare it with what we are expecting from perestroika and with what communists, commanders, and the Armed Forces political agencies are capable of.

They say the reverses of fortune are the touchstone for a courageous man. Courageous people are serving in the Army and Navy. And they are honorably carrying out all missions which the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government task them with and they will do everything required of them so that the Armed Forces, as the party demands, are always modern, reliable, and strong.

Military Deputy On Gorbachev Speech, Defense Budget Figures
18010695 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
31 May 89 First Edition p 1

[Article by Correspondents Captain First Rank V. Lukashevich and Lieutenant Colonel V. Kosarev: "Our Interview: Time For Concrete Actions"]

[Excerpt] The chief event of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies' fifth day was the report by M. S. Gorbachev, Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, "On the Basic Guidelines of USSR Domestic and Foreign Policy."

In the break between sessions, our correspondents, Capt First Rank V. Lukashevich and Lt Col V. Kosarev, asked several deputies to share their views on the report they heard and on the problems raised in it.

Major A. Gonchar, secretary of the N. regiment party committee:

Today we learned for the first time that our military budget stands at 77.3 billion rubles, and that it will be cut by 10 billion rubles in 1990-1991. And I'm seeing how, during the break, many correspondents have thrown themselves on the deputies who represent the army and navy to ask, "How are you going to feel when they slash military expenditures?" We're going to feel just fine. First, the money will be used to meet the needs of the people—perhaps it will be used to help the 40 million Soviet people who are below the subsistence minimum, or to build housing, which is in such short supply in our country, or to help disabled Afghan war veterans, who sacrificed their health in fulfilling their internationalist duty.

Second, the speaker observed that the army has been, is, and will remain the offspring of the people. Great efforts are now under way in the armed forces to shift to qualitative parameters—that is, to maintain the motherland's defenses at the proper level, as required by both our

defensive doctrine and our people, with fewer weapons and personnel, but improved combat performance and combat training on the part of our soldiers and officers.

I am confident that we will hear more on this from the Congress. And not just about how to charge the army with nonexistent faults in the most scathing way. [passage omitted]

Letter to Editor Urges Joint NATO-Warsaw Pact Armed Forces

52000055 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 23, 11-18 Jun 89 p 4

[Letter from I. Barabanov, candidate of engineering sciences, Mirnyy, Arkhangelsk Oblast: "Attention, Policy Makers!"]

[Text] The problem worrying everyone at the moment is how to avoid a catastrophe that could destroy humanity. Individual states can hardly protect their populations from such a catastrophe; the concerted efforts of mankind are needed.

I therefore propose that:

1. The guaranteed inviolability of existing national borders be ensured by a system of international legal, political, economic and military measures.
2. Joint NATO-Warsaw Treaty forces be set up preventing possible aggression against individual countries or groups of countries inside and outside this military alliance.

These joint armed forces (JAF) shall be governed by international legislation. They shall be removed from the authority of national governments and subordinated to the Council of Foreign Ministers of the states forming the alliance, or a specially elected international non-governmental council. The size of the armed forces and armaments (conventional and nuclear) shall be reduced by at least 50 per cent.

3. An international system of financing the JAF and the military industries of the alliance member-countries shall be organized.
4. The proposed military alliance shall be made open to all countries with the idea of joining the world's armed forces. As the alliance expands, the JAF structure, armaments and military production capacities shall be revised.
5. The staff of military industries, servicemen and auxiliary personnel made redundant due to closures and reorganization of the armed forces, shall retain all their present privileges until they find new jobs.

It would be interesting to know the opinion of the USSR people's deputies about this proposed plan, since they will be influencing the Soviet Union's foreign and domestic policy making.

Chief of Cadres Directorate Interviewed

18010535 Moscow KOMMUNIST
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian
No 6, Mar 89 pp 33-38

[Interview with Lt Gen V. Lelin, chief of Ground Forces Personnel Directorate, in the column: "The Social Sphere—Sphere of Party Influence": "Proper Assignments"; date and place not given; first paragraph is KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL introduction]

[Text] Viktor Petrovich Lelin has been serving in the Armed Forces since 1951. He graduated from the Lvov Military School imeni N. A. Shchors and the Military Academy imeni M. V. Frunze. He has held the positions of platoon leader, company commander, battalion chief of staff, regimental commander, division chief of staff, personnel department chief of a group of forces, and personnel directorate deputy chief of the Ground Forces.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] Comrade lieutenant general, improvement of combat readiness of units and subunits is associated primarily with consideration of the human factor, which, in turn, is tied to personnel work. In this connection, much depends on the skill commanders and superior officers display in thinking and acting in the spirit of the times. In other words, it is important to follow a steadfast and purposeful line to expand glasnost and apply social justice in resolving personnel problems. Unfortunately, all is not yet well in this area; the letters received by the editors confirm this. What can you tell us in this regard?

[Lelin] As we all know, the January (1987) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee set the basic guidelines for personnel policy to be followed under the conditions of perestroika. As applied to the Armed Forces, they are contained in the directives issued by the USSR minister of defense that deal with military cadres. Along with more stringent requirements, we have been presented with the task of steadfastly realizing the line of greater glasnost, democratization, and observance of legality and social justice in the resolution of personnel problems.

I take the opportunity of noting here that the 19th All-Union Party Conference made a resolution on the need for orienting defense construction toward primarily quality factors relative to equipment and manpower of the Armed Forces. The connection between that and personnel policy is clear. Take the forthcoming reductions in our Army, for example. They present commanders, chiefs, and personnel organs with a multitude of formidable problems, the resolution of which should to a great extent be beneficial to the officer review process slated for this year. Its purpose is to determine the suitability of each officer to the position he occupies and his potential for advancement. In a word, it is to make a fundamental determination of what each officer is worth.

It is no secret that we have people that do not meet today's high requirements; they bring discredit on the Soviet officer's uniform. Although there are few such cases, we cannot close our eyes to their existence. Simply stated, we propose to discharge into the reserves those who do not wish to serve in an honorable manner. Their places will be taken by more deserving persons. This process is already under way.

However, there is a greater purpose of the review than that. It should serve as a starting point for activating officer educational work, an incentive for them to strive to carry out their duties in a conscientious manner, an example of service and conduct, for their active participation in the life of party and Komsomol organizations, a goal for constant self-improvement. This can be attained only by applying principles of democracy and justice to the resolution of personnel problems.

The ability to work with cadres in an atmosphere of glasnost and spirit of justice is a most important requirement made of commanders and superior officers. This obligates the officer community to consider candidates recommended for new assignments, especially in cases of promotion to the next higher position.

In our component—the Ground Forces—leading commanders and chiefs involved with personnel problems make an effort to apply permanent efficiency review boards, officer party and Komsomol meetings, and officers' honor courts of peers. The application of these kinds of democratic principles to personnel work makes it possible to reduce to a minimum errors associated with promotions, conferring of rank, reassignment, and discharge into the reserves.

An example I can cite here involves Colonel Ye. Gorylev, who is on duty in a large unit (soyedineniye) of the Odessa Military District. Personnel problems in that unit are resolved in an atmosphere of glasnost, in a just manner, which of course is conducive to formation of a healthy moral climate in the collective. This has been an important factor in the unit's receiving a good rating for several years in a row.

In a motorized rifle regiment of the Far East Military District, Major V. Mikhaylov exercises skill in his supervision of a permanent efficiency review board. There, personnel problems relating to officer personnel are resolved in a collective manner.

However, the glasnost principle has not yet been granted free passage everywhere. In a unit of the Transbaykal Military District where Colonel M. Batyrov is serving, at one time candidates for promotion were reviewed only by the commander and his deputies. M. Batyrov—to his credit—derived a benefit from criticism levelled at him. Consider another example from the same district. Lieutenant Colonel V. Teplinskiy proposed that Major Yu. Lubchenko be promoted to the next higher position. He

did this without taking into account the opinion of the party organization. When the officer's situation was discussed in an atmosphere of communists, his promotion was not approved.

Now, in this rating period, there is a trend toward elimination of resolving personnel problems in secret. There are more frequent applications of the present norm, whereby efficiency reports are written with input from party and Komsomol organizations, with approval exercised by officers' meetings. This procedure insures that subjectivism is kept to a minimum in the evaluation process.

Democratization of personnel policy as practiced in Army conditions does have its peculiarities, of course. This is due primarily to USSR Armed Forces employment of the one-man command principle. It is the skillful tie of this principle to democracy and glasnost and the reliance on party organizations that produce such good results. This is especially true as it pertains to the approval of candidates for commanders of regiments, divisions and higher levels, and chiefs of branches of the Army and services of the district and central apparatus. We all know that this kind of selection is made on the scale of Ground Forces. However, instances of officer promotion by direction of higher authority does not exclude democracy, glasnost, or observance of social justice.

The above took place in the case of Lieutenant Colonel A. Koryakin of the Turkestan Military District. He proved himself to be a forceful, motivated, and knowledgeable officer—one who was skillful in his handling of people. The district cadre organ took action to review his qualifications for promotion to a higher position. The matter was turned over to the officers' collective for review by the efficiency report board. The decision was unanimous: A. Koryakin was suitable. The promotion was approved to good effect. He is successful in carrying out his new duties, and has been recommended for admission into the General Staff Military Academy.

There was a case of another kind. Major General A. Svechnikov was being considered for promotion in the Northern Group of Forces. I can state openly that there were doubts concerning his moral qualities, a fact which was reported to headquarters by the cadre organs. Unfortunately, all factors were not taken into account, with the result that, six months after Major General A. Svechnikov had occupied his new position, he was charged with unethical behavior in violation of party responsibility and recommended for demotion.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] Present practice is to speak of stagnation phenomena in the past tense. Does that mean that negative incidents that occurred have been completely overcome? I have in mind mainly formalism, favoritism, and secrecy.

[Lelin] Stagnation phenomena are observable primarily in year-to-year repetition of the same shortcomings, omissions, and mistakes made in assignment, training, and education of officers, and in observing legality and social justice as officers continue in their careers. This includes cases of violation of the procedure established for discharge into the reserves. Many commanders have used various pretenses to commit this violation by enlisting the support of superior officers. With each passing year there was a growing number of overage officers and generals; ageing of Army cadres; disruption of smooth personnel replacement in large units, staffs, and higher educational institutions; occurrence of difficulties in finding slots for VUZ graduates.

This apparently produced a paradox: All commanders and chiefs were acquainted with the problems, but they did not prepare the documents required for discharge after the prescribed periods of service, waiting for some kind of special instructions from above. In some cases it was simply a matter of fear of replacing service-worthy officers who had completed their terms of service by young officers who would require greater attention in the period of their professional development.

This kind of situation was most unfavorable in the Kiev, Odessa, North Caucasus, and Moscow Military Districts, and in academies. Plans for transferring officers of units, large units, and VUZ's were drawn up there every year. Cadre organs were charged with supervisory control over accomplishment of the plans. However, the responsible commanders and chiefs altered the plans, as a rule extending the period of service of their subordinates.

We must put an end to this kind of practice. The reductions in the Armed Forces presents us with the task of discharging officers and generals who have attained maximum age. Plans to that effect have been drawn up and approved. Their accomplishment has been placed under strict supervision.

Negative phenomena such as formalism, secrecy, and favoritism have not been wiped out completely. There are many cases where commanders and cadre organs permit officer transfers that are purposeless and unjustified with respect to the interest of the service. Thus, in the Leningrad Military District, 50 percent of the officers were transferred to equivalent positions. In the Far East Military District, Senior Lieutenant S. Chelan was assigned to the same kind of position four times in a five-month period. Did that serve any purpose? This kind of formalism in the work of commanders, superiors and cadre organs is a major cause of the many cases of short tenures of officer cadres.

Another fact I can cite is that one-third of Ground Forces officers are transferred every year. This is due to objective causes, which include incoming officers from troops that are stationed in foreign countries or in areas where

tours of duty are limited; temporary foreign duty; educational assignments; interdistrict and interbranch transfers; discharge from active duty; and transfers effected to staff a unit or bring it up to strength. An extremely high transfer rate can give rise to secrecy relative to resolving personnel problems, favoritism, and violation of law and justice. An effective method of combatting such negative elements is participation in the resolution of cadre problems on the part of the officer community and party and Komsomol organizations.

Many errors that are committed in cadre work are traceable to a poor knowledge of the political, professional, and moral qualities of people. This being the case, there is a need for improving the ways and methods of studying, selecting, and assigning officer personnel. This includes the efficiency review process, which is in need of renewal in the light of glasnost and objectivity to enable evaluation of positive qualities and shortcomings of people. The efficiency review process affords commanders and chiefs the opportunity of becoming more familiar with their subordinates, gives them specific advice and counsel, and properly determines the prospects of their progress in the service. This is seen as one of the ways to overcome stagnation in cadre policy, including favoritism.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] Our readers' letters tell us that there are cases where much difficulty is encountered when attempts are made to overcome stagnation; the hindrance is due to the open practice of the coercive administrative approach on the part of personnel officers, commanders, and chiefs. The actions of political organs and party organizations are not always creditable in this regard.

[Lelin] The coercive administrative approach employed in personnel problems took shape in the absence of democracy and glasnost; it still exists in the form of favoritism. Thus, 40 officers who were serving under close relatives were transferred out of a group of forces in 1987 alone. Necessary transfers were also effected in internal districts.

It may be said that the majority of commanders and chiefs now realize that the coercive command approach must be eliminated. However, there are persons who wish to express their will in cadre assignments against the interests of the matter. Let me cite an example.

Colonel A. Koval, a deputy commander of a large unit of the Kiev Military District, is a fine and knowledgeable officer. He was regarded positively by his superiors for a period of seven years. Action for his demotion was brought against him all of a sudden. An investigation was conducted. It revealed that the "basis" of this extreme measure was an incident that had occurred in a battalion subordinate to the unit deputy commander for armaments. That had occurred six months previously. In addition, all of Colonel A. Koval's direct superiors were opposed to his demotion, but the action continued

through channels under pressure from district headquarters. The Ground Forces commander did not agree with this patently unjust decision.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] Cadre problems are always associated with social justice. Their resolution has a strengthening or even destructive effect, which invariably affects morale and, consequently, accomplishment of missions in a collective. What is your opinion?

[Lelin] First, I would like to say that many problems of this type can take in an extensive geographic area. To comply with the government's decrees relative to including a number of military districts in the replacement areas, officer personnel must be replaced after a certain length of time. They are serving in military schools, military commissariats, and military science departments of VUZ's. This will have some negative impact on their military service and living conditions, of course, but this move will make it possible to practice social justice. It is clear that commanders, chiefs, and cadre organs carry a great responsibility for selecting personnel replacements in groups of forces and in areas where difficult climatic conditions prevail. Party and Komsomol organizations and the officer community must play a greater role; they must participate more actively in evaluating candidates for transfer to new assignments. If this condition is met, the social justice principle will not be violated.

Analysis shows that 32 percent of the officer corps has served only in western military districts, with a mere 19 percent in the eastern. One of the main causes of this—what we can openly describe as injustice—Involves occurrences of stagnation in cadre policy. An officer's place of assignment was often traceable to a blood relationship, acquaintances, or favoritism. The resulting damage to morality was considerable. Some people lost their faith in justice; interest was lost in the results of labor.

The situation is being rectified. As mentioned above, officers serving with highly-placed relatives are being transferred out of groups of forces and districts where favorable climatic conditions prevail. The previous geographic assignments of graduates of military academies are taken into account as a factor bearing on their new assignment. For example, if an officer's previous service was in the East, he is sent to a western district or group of forces, and vice-versa. The same procedure is followed in assigning officers from groups of forces and remote areas of the USSR. All this is carried out in an atmosphere of broad glasnost, with the active participation of party and Komsomol organizations and the officer community.

Instances of violation of the social justice principle still do occur. Thus, Colonel A. Komlik was transferred from the GSVG [Group of Soviet Forces in Germany] to the Turkestan Military District, since he had previously

served in Odessa. After taking up his new assignment, he started to "push" for a transfer to the Odessa Military District. He achieved his goal. Colonel A. Komlik took advantage of the lack of principles of cadre organ personnel in the Turkestan Military District to effect a rapid transfer to Odessa. Measures taken by us had the result of returning the officer to his previous assignment, and the persons who did his bidding were punished in accordance with service procedure.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] It is no secret that there is growing discussion of a category of officers termed "unpromising" due to age. Such personnel tend to show an increase. However, this category includes a large number of competent officers—ones who possess an exceptional background. The removal of positive prospects has an effect on their attitude toward their service. What is being done to resolve this problem?

[Lelin] The classification of "unpromising" applied to officers due to age arose several years ago as a result of verbal directives received "from above" that limited the age of people relative to assignment to key command and staff positions. This led to stagnation at the platoon-company-battalion level. Candidates for reassignment are presently considered only on the basis of their political, professional, and moral qualities.

Resolution of the problem also depends on the skill displayed by cadre organs in proper planning of officer transfers. The consequences of aberrations permitted may be illustrated by citing the case of a large unit in which officer V. Gubarenko is serving. About 40 percent of the unit's company and battery commanders have been serving in a particular capacity for five years and longer. Prospects for their promotion in the near future are poor. Why? Because 80 percent of the battalion chiefs of staff cannot be considered for promotion to higher positions due to the fact that they took a demotion before being assigned to the unit.

Also under the same Belorussian Military District is a large unit in which officer V. Kashin is serving. None of the officers occupying key command and staff positions have held the assignment longer than five years.

Against the background of the above polar differences relative to resolution of personnel problems, I would like to discuss the following trend. There are large units and units in which higher authorities of districts have a different attitude. As a rule, their careful selections bring in the cream of the officer crop. What about other units? They are assigned the remainder. Thus, units and sub-units are treated unevenly. As a rule, units and training centers collocated with district headquarters received special treatment as privileged, so-called "court" units.

In my opinion, this practice does nothing to further successful resolution of tasks by all military collectives of a district. It also leads to aberrations in cadre policy.

However, we have deviated somewhat from the topic of the so-called "unpromising officers." Let me continue this subject by citing an example. Colonel N. Moshkevich was considered to be one of them. Nevertheless, the Far East Military District headquarters did promote him to the next higher position. Evaluation of his performance during the training period indicates that the collective entrusted to him has received a good rating and that the officer is successful in carrying out his duties.

Resolution of the given problem is generally directly associated with scrupulous observance of the USSR Law on Universal Military Obligation. I am referring to discharging into the reserves those officers and generals who have completed their term of service. They comprise 5.6 percent of the Ground Forces. Two years ago this figure was 7 percent versus a target norm of 4 percent.

There is another obstacle to resolution of this problem. This has to do with prejudice displayed by some officials toward officers who have a record of party or disciplinary punishment. A man's progress cannot be held in check if he has corrected his shortcomings, changed his attitude toward his work, and produces good results. An individual approach must be employed.

Colonel A. Krivkin of the Leningrad Military District had a record of being relieved from his position as regimental commander due to irregularities in financial management. The officer self-critically recognized his transgressions, saw the error of his ways, and proceeded to work diligently to restore his good name, thus earning the right to continue his service.

Discussion of optimum lengths of service in a single capacity is nothing new. I am of the opinion that no purpose is served by "cutting up" an assignment into definite time periods. Much depends on individual abilities and potential of a person relative to his becoming proficient in his position and his readiness for the next higher assignment. Experience has shown that the professional development process progresses at different rates for different officers. In the case of key command and staff positions, it has an average duration of two to three years.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] As mentioned above, further improvement of the work of cadre organs is associated with the role played by party organizations. What can you tell us about the way they are presently operating, and what innovations may we expect?

[Lelin] The decree passed by the 1987 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee emphasized that the success of perestroika is largely dependent on the rapidity and depth with which our cadres will realize the need for

revolutionary changes and on the decisiveness, forcefulness, and competence of their actions. Army party organizations have concentrated their efforts on accomplishing this directive, made cadre work an object of their attention, and undertaken a persistent struggle to produce a pure and honorable type of officer.

We can see that the above has produced results by the fact that there has been a reduction in number of officers who have received disciplinary and party punishment. This is spite of the more stringent requirements made of officers.

However, the situation is still far from that which we prefer. Let me cite a specific example. Lieutenant Colonel S. Simonov was recalled from his foreign tour due to unbecoming conduct. The party organization removed his name from membership in the CPSU, and the command authorities took action to discharge him into the reserves. Action was also brought against the officials who recommended Lieutenant Colonel S. Simonov for the tour of foreign duty and who were so generous in their praise of the officer.

I believe that this approach raises the responsibility of authorities who attempt to rid themselves of undisciplined officers by falsifying the records and making recommendations for promotion and tours of foreign duty.

The present norm dictates that efficiency reports of communist officers that are being considered for reassignment be reviewed for approval at party meetings. This goes a long way to exclude narrow-mindedness, favoritism, and misassignment. Workers in cadre organs in line units are mindful of the opinion of secretaries of party organizations; they take into account their evaluation of moral and professional qualities of officers and use this information in their practical activity. The role played by communists in questions of selection, education, and assignment of cadres is growing. This is an important aspect of party work.

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Moiseyev Victory Day Article
18010594 Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA in
Russian 9 May 89 p 3

[Article by General of the Army M.A. Moiseyev, Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces and First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR: "Unfading Deed"]

[Text] The Soviet people and all progressive mankind are celebrating a great, radiant holiday—the 44th anniversary of the victory over Nazi fascism. On 9 May 1945 the last salvos of the war subsided. The cause of justice, for which millions of people fought and gave their lives, had triumphed.

The Great Patriotic War lasted almost four years. Supported by the material resources of an enslaved Europe, the fascist hordes launched on our country an assault of enormous magnitude. Across the borders of our homeland streamed 153 German divisions and 37 divisions of satellite countries. In several sectors the aggressor outnumbered Soviet forces four or five to one.

From the Barents Sea to the Black Sea fierce, bloody battles raged. Over a period of 4 and 1/2 months the Nazis captured the Baltic region, Belorussia, and a great part of the Ukraine, and they penetrated to the walls of Moscow and Leningrad. Important economic regions, a great quantity of combat equipment, and huge stores of fuel, munitions, and other material goods fell into their hands.

Recalling the inconceivable price the Soviet people paid for victory, we return again to the tragedy of 1941 so that it may not be repeated in the future.

How could it happen that we retreated to the Volga and then took three more years to drive the Fascists from our land?

The Communist Party and the Soviet government, foreseeing the inevitability of war, launched an urgent program to reinforce the armed forces in every possible way; however, they did not succeed in implementing all the intended measures before the beginning of the war. Stalin and the other political and military leaders assumed that Hitler could not turn to the East before the defeat of England. According to their calculations, we had time, at least until the middle of 1942. This first strategic error led to many others.

We did not have time to reorganize the economy on the lines of an expanded production of arms and military equipment, to equip a theater of military operations, to define plans for the strategic deployment of forces, to reorganize and rearm the Army, or to plan and implement the mobilization and strategic deployment of the armed forces.

Before the beginning of the war the western military districts had not been brought to combat readiness, the creation of force dispositions to turn back the attacks of the fascist armies had not been completed, and the axis of the enemy's main thrust had been incorrectly determined. All this put the Soviet forces in an extremely unfavorable position.

There were also substantial defects in Soviet military theory. There was no provision for the possibility of a forced transition of the armed forces to a strategic defense. The staffs and forces were not prepared to conduct a strategic defense and were oriented towards an enemy defeat on foreign soil with little bloodshed. A theory of strategic defense was worked out only in the course of combat operations and was tested on the battlefield.

The development of theory and practical experience was adversely affected by purges in the Army, including those aimed at a significant portion of talented and experienced command cadres, of whom there was a severe shortage. This was reflected significantly in the level of combat effectiveness. Before the beginning of the war more than 70 percent of division and regimental commanders had held their posts a year or less. Nor did the purges end after the war had begun. Many of the generals and officers arrested prior to the beginning of the war were executed after it was under way.

In the course of evaluating the combat capabilities of the forces of both sides, the Soviet command unjustifiably exaggerated its own capabilities and underestimated those of the enemy. It was believed that, on the defense, one of our divisions could repel an assault by two or three of the enemy's divisions. On the offense, 1 and ½ of our divisions were to overcome a defending enemy division.

The Soviet forces suffered heavy human losses as they retreated. It was a difficult time for the Soviet people and their armed forces. But nothing could shake their courage and their confidence in victory. The fascist hordes encountered stubborn resistance on Soviet soil. In the first months of the war the enemy suffered tangible losses and dozens of its elite divisions were defeated.

The further the enemy penetrated inland, the stronger the Soviet people's opposition grew. On the fields near Moscow it reached the point where the enemy was powerless to overcome it and, as the result of a retaliatory attack by the Soviet forces, the enemy was thrown back from the walls of Moscow 100-250 kilometers. Here the myth of the invincibility of the German Army was shattered forever, the Nazi plan for a "blitzkrieg war" was once and for all frustrated, and a fundamental turning point in the conduct of the war was reached. The enemy forces were compelled to abandon aggressive operations simultaneously on the entire Soviet-German front. They took up a strategy of conducting the war in stages and organized the offense into separate sectors.

In summer 1942 the Stalingrad sector was one of the most important. An offensive launched here by an elite fascist combat force turned out unsuccessful. After bleeding the enemy in defensive battle, the Soviet forces inflicted an unprecedented defeat in the course of a counterattack. A 330,000-strong enemy combat force was surrounded and utterly routed. Total enemy losses near Stalingrad came to about 1.5 million men. The Nazi war machine was rocked to its foundations.

The command of the Wehrmacht made its final attempt to seize the strategic initiative in summer 1943 in the Kursk region. However here too the enemy failed to take its revenge. The Soviet armed forces inflicted irreplaceable losses. The forces of fascist Germany and its allies were compelled to assume the defensive on all theaters of the Second World War. The strategic initiative passed

into the hands of the Soviet military command and remained there until the end of the war. Germany was presented with a military catastrophe. The disintegration of the fascist bloc began.

In the campaign of Kursk and in the battles on the Dnieper and the Ukraine's left bank a fundamental turning point was reached in the course of the Great Patriotic War and the entire Second World War. A mass expulsion of the enemy from Soviet territory began.

The large-scale strategic operations of the Soviet Armed Forces in Belorussia, the Ukraine, and the Baltic region in 1944-1945, the crippling blows to the enemy in the battles for the liberation of Poland, Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and other European states, and the combat operations on the territory of Germany led to a complete rout of the Wehrmacht.

Faithful to its allied commitments, the Soviet Armed Forces defeated the million-strong Kwantung army in the Far East and forced militarist Japan to capitulate.

The Soviet-German front was, for the entire duration of the war, the decisive front in the armed struggle with the fascist aggressor. It was here the main battles occurred, and here were achieved the most important military results, which determined the outcome of the Second World War. It was specifically the armed forces of the Soviet Union who, in fierce armed combat, crushed the Nazi war machine and liberated the enslaved peoples of many of the countries of Europe and Asia. For almost three years the Soviet armed forces single-handedly fought the enemy. A second front was opened only when it became apparent that the Soviet Union was able to defeat fascist Germany on its own.

The victory over Nazi Germany and its satellites was won by the combined efforts of the peoples of many countries. The Soviet people remember and deeply respect the selfless struggle with the fascist invaders and estimate at its true worth the contribution made to the common cause by the peoples and armies of Yugoslavia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania; by the patriots of Hungary and Albania; by members of the opposition movement and the antifascist underground; and by the peoples and armies of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, and the other states in the anti-Nazi coalition.

In the complex international situation of the postwar period the Soviet Union and the countries of the Warsaw Pact did everything possible to achieve a military and strategic equilibrium with the United States and NATO in order to preserve their own security.

Recently the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies, motivated by new political thinking, have done much for the normalization of the international climate, including the implementation of a number of concrete, practical

steps in a unilateral manner. By proclaiming a specifically defensive military doctrine and resolving to decrease the quantity of armed forces and weapons, they have demonstrated to the entire world their readiness to untie the stubborn knots in international relations and to make the transition from the principle of excessive armament [sverkhvooruzhennost] to that of reasonable sufficiency for defense.

Provisions are being made for a systematic conversion of the defense complex. By 1995, 60 percent of the total volume of production will be converted over. Many factories, design offices, and their related knowledge are engaged in the production of consumer goods and machinery, equipment, and other goods for agriculture, light industry, and the food industry. This year alone there are plans for the country's military enterprises to manufacture civilian products worth 27 million rubles. A significant part of military transport aviation is being shifted to the service of freight traffic for the national economy.

We must not agree with those who advocate a professional army. The transition to manpower acquisition for the armed forces on a voluntary basis will give rise to repeated increases in expenditures for their maintenance. Besides, such a system will not allow us to have trained reserves, without which we will not be able to implement a strategic deployment of the armed forces in the event of a threat of war. It rules out the possibility of restoring the combat effectiveness of forces which have sustained losses in combat and, all the more, the creation of new military units.

GlavPU 1st Deputy Chief Sorokin Victory Day Statement

*18010579 Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA
9 May 89 pp 1-2*

[Article by Fleet Adm A. Sorokin, first deputy chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy: "A Victory of Combat Fraternity"]

[Text] One of the most exciting dates in the heroic history of our homeland is 9 May 1945. That day the salvos of a triumphant gun salute in Moscow informed the world of the great Victory of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces over Hitlerite Germany.

Many pages in the history of the Great Patriotic War are being revised today, in the situation of the revolutionary renewal of our society and the development of democratic processes and *glasnost*. I refer to the elimination of "blank spots" in the coverage of the initial period of the war, the role of certain party and state leaders in our victories and defeats, the nature of the operations and the separate periods of the war and problems pertaining to prisoners of war and human losses. And one has to agree with this. Today's and future generations must

know what incredible difficulties, suffering and deprivations the Soviet people and their Armed Forces had to endure to route fascism, the most aggressive and reactionary force of that time.

This war has no equal in world history with respect to its scope and ferocity, its human and material losses, because even the fascists believed that "it is not a military conflict between individual states but a gigantic battle between peoples and races, in which one Weltanschauung will win and the other will be destroyed without mercy."

When fascist Germany's rulers and their satellites worked out the plans for the war, they regarded the USSR as an artificial association of an enormous number of nations, as an inviable ethnic conglomeration. The secret "Directives on Management of the Economy in the Newly Occupied Areas (the Green Folder)" set forth the mission of inciting civil strife in our nation for the disintegration of the multinational state.

The actual course of events in the war refuted the enemy's calculations, however. What is more, the concepts of proletarian internationalism embodied in the Leninist principles for building our multinational state and its Armed Forces were an important factor in the Soviet Union's victory.

Millions of people from Russian and Ukrainian villages, the hamlets of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, the mountain communities of the Caucasus, from the cities and settlements of all the nation's republics and krais, rose up to battle fascism. Almost all the residents of the Armenian settlement of Chardakhly, located within the Azerbaijan SSR, came to the homeland's defense. A total of 1,250 of its people fought at the front, including 185 officers, one general and two marshals: Heroes of the Soviet Union MSU I.Kh. Bagramyan and Mar Armored Trps A.Kh. Babadzhanyan. People from the settlement were awarded more than 2,000 orders and medals for combat feats, but every fourth fightingman failed to return to his native hearth.... This is not an isolated example.

The political, economic and military cooperation of the socialist nations and ethnic groups was strengthened and tempered, and their solidarity and their faith in victory increased in the struggle against fascism. The Communist Party made an all-out effort to make millions of Soviet people of various nationalities convinced fighters at the front and in the rear area. For example, the indoctrination of Red Army men and junior commanders of non-Russian nationality was designated a separate area of work of the Main Political Directorate and the party organizations of the Red Army.

More than 80 national divisions and brigades fought during the war. Uzbek and Kazakh formations fought heroically at the walls of Stalingrad. The 95th Moldavian Rifle Division earned fame in the fighting for Odessa. A

Latvian rifle division which entered the fighting in December of 1941 defended Moscow, fought at Staraya Russa and helped liberate its native Latvia. The 12th Bashkir Cavalry Division covered its fighting colors with unfading glory in the fighting on the Don. The 89th Armenian Rifle Division bore its colors victoriously from the foothills of the Caucasus to Berlin.

The formation of volunteer defense forces became particularly large-scale during the difficult first period of the war. Around 4 million people went voluntarily to the front during the very first months.

The close combat fraternity of peoples of the USSR was manifested also in the broad scope of the partisan movement. Suffice it to say that partisans of more than 70 nationalities fought valorously on Belorussian soil, 62 in the Ukraine and 30 in the North Caucasus. Or take this example. In addition to Lithuanians (69), 12 Russians, 4 Ukrainians, 4 Jews, 2 Poles, a Belorussian and a Georgian served as commanders of partisan detachments in Lithuania alone.

The victorious outcome of the war was a natural result also of the combined economic efforts of all the Union republics. All of our country's nations and ethnic groups made a contribution to the victory over the enemy, demonstrating the great strength of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The multinational Soviet Army was an army of heroes during the Great Patriotic War. Among the Heroes of the Soviet Union were members of 100 nations and ethnic groups: 8,160 Russians, 2,069 Ukrainians, 309 Belorussians, 161 Tatars, 108 Jews, 96 Kazakhs, 90 Georgians, 90 Armenians, 69 Uzbeks....

"Don't thumb through the wax-spattered pages of ancient books, mama, don't go to grandad Arkhipov Nadenov, don't look with him for a sacred miracle in our remarkable deeds," wrote junior political instructor Yu. Kazmin to his mother in 1943. "Listen to me: We conquer death not because we are invulnerable. We conquer death not just because we are fighting for our lives; in combat we think about the life of the Uzbek boy, the Georgian woman, the old Russian man. We take to the battlefield in order to defend the holy of holies, the homeland."

How amazingly the words of Soviet patriot Kazmin interweave with Friedrich Engels' ideas on people of a socialist society: "...a member of such a society (socialist—A.S.) in a war... has to defend a real homeland, a real hearth.... He will consequently fight with enthusiasm, with steadfastness and bravery, before which the mechanical training of a modern army has to be blown away like straw."

I would point out that toward the end of the war the representation of many nationalities in the Armed Forces was proportionate to their representation in the

population of the USSR. Nothing like this had ever before been seen. And the further strengthening of fraternal friendship of peoples and consolidation of the unity of the multinational Soviet society are still one of the crucial prerequisites for ensuring our homeland's security. It was no accident that the 19th party conference assigned a major mission to the Armed Forces: to make the service a real school of internationalism. Today, not just the army and navy as a whole are multinational, but every military unit and ship crew.

Despite the well-known nationalistic infections in a number of the nation's regions, a proper level of political maturity and concern for strengthening the international unity of the military collectives are still manifested in the army and navy. "One must not underestimate or trifle with nationalistic sentiments," V.I. Lenin said. "One must be a thousand times cautious in the matter." We can see that the need to improve international relations in the army and navy is growing faster than the existing substance and forms of work in this area. In some places we still have obsolete ideas that there are no problems in international relations, cases of national egotism and arrogance and national cliquishness. On the other hand, the caliber of international communication on the part of a number of officers is still poor. Some of them lack adequate theoretical knowledge and skills for shaping healthy relations in the military collectives, and not all of them are prepared to perform individual work with fightingmen of different nationalities. The situation is made worse by the fact that there are few representatives of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus at the military educational institutions, even though around a third of the army and navy personnel are from those republics. There are also very few officers representing the Baltic republics.

As they prepare for the CPSU CC plenum on international relations, commanders, political organs and party organizations have significantly increased their international indoctrination work. A unified system has been set up to direct it in the army and navy: commissions and groups for international relations have been established. A program for satisfying the national cultural needs of the fightingmen has been developed and is being implemented. Reference aids and methodological recommendations have been prepared with information on the historical and national features of the Union republics and the ethnic distinctiveness of the traditions and common customs of the peoples inhabiting them. Subscriptions to newspapers and magazines in the national languages have increased in the units and on the ships, 10-day celebrations of the Union republics are held, libraries in the languages of peoples of the USSR are being established, and methods centers are being set up for teaching good international relations.

We are counting greatly on assistance from the party and soviet organs in the Union and autonomous republics in this work.

Relying on the force of conviction and the prestige of the law and military regulations, we shall continue resolutely to counteract the slightest attempts to divert the natural national feelings of the fightingmen into the destructive channel of nationalism. The entire experience with Soviet military organizational development, the lessons of the Great Patriotic War and our involvement in the events in Afghanistan have shown that the strength of the army and navy lies in consistent internationalism and effective internationalist indoctrination.

32nd Guards Tank Division Commander on Withdrawal From GSFG
*18010578 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
9 May 89 First Edition p 2*

[Article by Guards Col S. Dokuchayev, commander of the 32nd Guards Poltava, Red Banner, Orders of Suvorov and Kutuzov Tank Division, under the rubric "Beneath Colors Covered With Glory": "It Will Remain in the Heart"]

[Text] The Soviet forces to be removed from the GDR this year include a formation with a glorious combat history. It is the 32nd Guards, Poltava, Red Banner, Orders of Suvorov and Kutuzov Tank Division. We are giving Guards Col Sergey Aleksandrovich Dokuchayev, its commander, an opportunity to comment.

The nearer the day approaches when the division will begin its departure from the nation which it liberated from fascism in the spring of 1945, the more acutely we recognize the historic mission which it performed here in the preservation of peace in Europe. Yes, the time for summing up the results is coming: the first trains will move out to the East within the next few days. And today everyone who stands beneath the division's colors no doubt wants to look back mentally, to glance over the path traveled.

The division's combat history began in the hard year of '42. It entered into combat as a rifle formation of the Northwest Front on the Staraya Russa sector. The former assault troops, Pacific sailors and workers of Moscow Oblast's Lyuberetskiy Rayon who comprised the backbone of the newly formed division did not flinch in those difficult battles.

Our division happened to participate in the most important battles of the Great Patriotic War. And always in the first echelons, always at the edge, on the most crucial sectors: the battle at Prokhorovka, Poltava, Kremenchug, the forcing of the Dnepr, Kirovograd, the famous Sandomierz bridgehead, Dresden, Prague....

It is not difficult to imagine the courage demanded of the division's soldiers and commanders at Prokhorovka, let us say. There is practically no mention of the infantry's participation in that tank battle. But our division was located on the axis of the main thrust and switched to the offensive along with the tankmen. Where the historical

account speaks of participation in the liberation of cities, one invariably finds the words: "Stormed...", "Concentrated on sector... and captured by storm..." This means that the Guardsmen were in front. This is particularly exciting to me. Somewhere there my father traveled the frontline roads....

The glorious combat traditions of our army were born in the heat of those extremely fierce battles: courage, steadfastness, mass heroism and selfless devotion to the homeland. Our division's Guardsmen have exhibited all of these things too. During the war 62 of them were made Heroes of the Soviet Union, and the names of three—Guards Capt G. Balayan, Guards Sr Sgt I. Shabanov and Guards Jr Sgt V. Levin—have been entered in perpetuity on the rosters of division units. More than 9,000 were awarded orders and medals.

We inherited a truly valuable legacy. And the division's entire postwar history has been one of continuing the heroic traditions of the frontline fighters.

After the war the formation was stationed in the GDR. It was not an easy time. The waves of the "cold war" threatened to burst out of their banks. In that complex situation the division's daily life was filled with intense combat training and the mastering of new equipment. The Guardsmen held their honor high. In 1974 the division was awarded the Banner of the USSR Minister of Defense for courage and military valor, and it has been awarded the Challenge Red Banner of the Military Council of the Ground Forces three times. There have been instances in which the Guardsmen, like the frontline fighters of that regiment, have demonstrated real valor and heroism, and the best features of our Soviet soldier have been manifested in their actions.

The spontaneous explosion of a shell left from the war started a forest fire in May 1971, for example. Fightingmen from our division went to the assistance of the German fire fighters. At the height of the battle with the fire, a group of our soldiers was cut off by the flames. Shells began to blow up nearby. The fightingmen continued to battle the fire in that extremely difficult situation, however. Not until all possibilities had been exhausted did they begin to break through the ring of fire. Pvt Aleksandr Yakovlev, a Komsomol member, died, performing his duty to the end and setting an example of courage and valor for his comrades. The grateful German comrades erected a monument at the site of the valorous fightingman's death.

Last year Guards Sgt Karimzhan Rezhametov and Guards Pts Vladimir Ivasik and Stanislav Patyukov helped deal with a traffic accident. A citizen of the GDR was saved thanks to their bold action. The fightingmen risked their life and did not leave the individual in trouble. They were awarded honorary certificates by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the GDR.

And how many times the fightingmen have come to the aid of our German friends with the farm work! These incidents unquestionably strengthened even more the friendship between the division's fightingmen and the workers of the GDR. And, naturally, we never felt like strangers on German soil.

During a recent meeting Paul Richmann, secretary of the district board of the Society for German-Soviet Friendship, made the following comment: "It is sad to part with the division, with our friends.... One feels as though he is losing a dear friend...." These simple words say a lot.

Our friendship with fightingmen of the National People's Army grew even stronger on the combat training fields. We repeatedly took part in joint tactical exercises. Fightingmen of the subunit commanded by Maj Yu. Vetrov were frequent guests in the R. Sorge Battalion of the GDR's National People's Army. Personnel of the National People's Army's radiotechnical battalion commanded by Maj W. Zeitler and the subordinates of Lt Col A. Shabalov have equally close ties.

Now we are leaving. I believe that the German friends will be left with good memories of the division. We came to this country to establish peace. We remained here to preserve peace. Our departure is also a peace-loving act.

The division's traditions will remain in the hearts and the actions of those who continue to serve in the USSR, of course. And some officers and warrant officers have been given the opportunity to continue their service in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. They will therefore bear our traditions into the lives of other military collectives. And we truly have remarkable people. The tank battalion commanded by Guards Maj S. Glagolev, for example, has had a good reputation in the forces for several years. One of this battalion's companies was the winner of the competition among tank subunits of the GSFG. The platoon commanded by Guards Sr Lt M. Piterskiy was best in the group of forces.

I have not commanded this renowned division very long. It seems like only yesterday that I accepted its colors from Guards Col V. Kurtsev, my predecessor. It seems to me that I have not yet had time to get a real feel for its combat history, but I now know that this time was an important stage in my life.

Many of our formations are undergoing organizational changes today. If one of them would take over our fighting colors and become the heir to this heroic history, both I and all of the division fightingmen would breath a sigh of relief. The [former] frontline fighters are making such suggestions in their letters. It is especially hard for them to accept the idea that the renowned formation will cease to exist. I do not believe that carrying out this suggestion would conflict in any way with our state's decision to demobilize units and formations withdrawn from the GDR.

We need also to think about the exhibits in our combat glory museum. We need to see that they continue to have maximum effect. Some displays and documents will go to the museum of the group of forces. I believe that the rest of them could be turned over to the area museums of Lyubertsy, where our division was formed, and Poltave, whose name it bears.

The date 9 May is not just a celebration of our victory. It is a day of triumph for peace over the entire planet. We came to German land in May of 1945 to provide peace and rid peoples of the brown plague. We are departing in May of 1989 to give mankind a chance to establish a world without wars and weapons on the planet. I personally feel a sense of pride in having had a part on both May of 1945 and May of 1989.

More on Military Applications of New Criminal Law

18010653 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
3 May 89 First Edition p 2

[Article by Col V. Astashin under the rubric "The Legal Reform: At the Crossroads of Opinions": "The Authority of an Order"]

[Text] The draft Fundamentals of Criminal Law of the USSR and the Union Republics has been submitted for national discussion. As a serviceman I was particularly interested in Article 27, "The Execution of an Order or Instruction." There is no such article in the current Law. Here is the text: "An act does not constitute a crime even if it fits the definition of a crime as specified by criminal law but is committed in the execution of an order or instruction if the individual was unaware of the criminal nature of the order or instruction (italics mine—V.A.). Moreover, the individual issuing the criminal order or instruction is liable for an act committed in its execution."

I am not a legal expert and I first assumed that the article had been worked out as a counterbalance to the methods of administering the national economy by means of orders and decrees. It has happened more than once in the past that ministries and departments have held complete sway over enterprises, while not bearing either legal or material, sometimes not even moral, responsibility. And usually all of the blame was dumped onto the "little man."

There must not be such a thing in the military. There one always knows who is the indirect or immediate commander (or chief), and therefore who originates the instructions. He who issues the order is responsible for its consequences, and not the one carrying it out, if the latter has not exceeded the authority indicated in the order.

Judging from everything, however, Article 27 applies in its entirety to the military, since no exceptions are mentioned. But this raises a number of questions.

The confusion is not caused by the article as a whole, but by the following point: "...if the individual was unaware of the criminal nature of the order or instruction." What is the sense of this stipulation? How is one to determine whether the order is criminal or not? By what criteria? Orders are sometimes issued with only a matter of minutes available to carry them out, after all, or even seconds—in combat and similar situations, let us say. Is it possible rapidly to determine what kind of order it is in this situation?

Furthermore, the Disciplinary Code (and it constitutes a law, since it is set forth in an ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet) forbids the questioning of an order. The person executing it must understand it, but only in order to implement it as well as possible and demonstrate prudent initiative, but certainly not to analyze the nature of the order. "The commander's (chief's) order is a law for subordinates. An order must be carried out unquestioningly, precisely and promptly," states Article 6 of the code. As we can see, it could not be more absolute.

Every Soviet citizen takes an oath when he begins his military service and formally vows to carry out unquestioningly all military regulations and orders from commanders and chiefs. Insubordination and failure to carry out an order are therefore military crimes. Under current law they are among the first: Articles 2 and 3 respectively. Depending upon the situation and the consequences punishment is specified in the form of imprisonment for a period of up to 10 years, and capital punishment is not ruled out in wartime.

Some people might disagree with me on the grounds that the new draft Fundamentals are submitted precisely so that the criminal codes and general military regulations can be revised in accordance with them. Some things can and need to be revised, of course, but not so as to destroy the foundation of the military structure. I am confident that Article 27 in its present edition poses such a threat. In my opinion, it undermines the very functional foundation of the military: subordination and compliance.

I shall illustrate how this could occur with an example. In his feature story "The Afghan" (LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, 15 February 1989), G. Bocharov cites the following incident. Pvt Shmakov shot some prisoners at the order of officer Rudykh, his commander. A military tribunal sentenced him to 5 years in an intensive-regimen corrective labor colony for this. Rudykh, however, was freed of liability by a pardon.

The soldier's colleagues protested: "We former soldier/internationalists do not understand what guided the court to hand down this decision. When we were in combat operations, we knew without a doubt that according to regulations the commander's order is law for subordinates."

They wrote the truth. This is what was demanded of them, what they were taught. The author of the article seems to be in agreement: "Granted also that I myself do not understand why officer Rudykh was not given a real sentence." He goes on to say, however: "It is amazing that even today, removed from that hardened atmosphere, while dignifying themselves with the name soldier/internationalists, they make no effort to grasp just what their comrade committed."

But why put it this way? There is a clear substitution of concepts. The author of the article confuses law with morality. And although the law is based on morality, it is far from always on the same level with the latter. What is a criminal order from the standpoint of the law? An order issued by a criminal. In other words, if it is declared to be criminal, this cannot be when the order is received but only after a court hearing—not otherwise.

If memory serves me, the general military regulations have been changed five times since our Armed Forces came into being. They have always been elevated to the level of a law. The purpose of the changes and additions was now to make relations among servicemen more humane, particularly between a superior and subordinates, now to make their application more rigid. The absolute nature of an order remained unchanged, however, except for insignificant refinements.

Both our party and our government demonstrate unvarying concern for the state of military discipline in the Armed Forces and for its all-around strengthening. Remember Lenin's statement: "Not out of fear but as a matter of conscience, observe the laws on the Red Army, execute all orders and do everything possible to maintain discipline in it...." This concept of Lenin's negates discipline by the rod, but it affirms the aware, conscientious observance of all laws and execution of all orders.

At first glance, all orders, instructions and directions are identical. They deliberately rule out any procedure of action other than that specified. Nonmilitary and military orders differ, however. The latter, particularly when issued during combat operations or under similar circumstances, are issued to help accomplish the combat mission and are therefore absolute. They are compulsory and demand selflessness. This is because balanced on the scale on the one side are the interests of the state and the society, its security and protection, and on the other, deprivations and danger to the health of the servicemen, and frequently to their lives. It is inadmissible to question the nature of an order if we want the former always to outweigh the latter.

This certainly does not mean that an order, even the most incontrovertible one, should not be analyzed after a certain period of time has elapsed. It can and must be, in order to derive lessons. Such a critique will change nothing in the past, of course, and should not overemphasize the role of those carrying out the orders. To do otherwise would create a quandary for the soldier; those

who do not carry out an order could become heroes. Any discussion of a military order would be incomplete without bringing in Afghanistan. Here again I feel that we need to precisely differentiate our attitude toward that war, now a thing of the past, and our attitude toward the soldier who took part in it. The two must not be identified as one. One hears a lot of criticism today about the circumstances surrounding the introduction of our forces into Afghanistan. We speak of it as though about "our old sins." We must not bring anything of the kind down upon the heads of those who honorably fulfilled their duty, however.

No matter how our view of the past—distant or quite recent—has changed, no matter how the assessments of certain events have subsequently changed, the soldier cannot bear the responsibility for it, because he was implementing the will of the state and following orders.

In short, I believe that Article 27 is not suitable in the form in which it is presented in the draft law. There needs to be a stipulation that it does not apply to the military, in which, due to its very specific circumstance, the commander always bears responsibility.

Volga MD Said to Lack Facilities for Personnel from GSFG

*18010683 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
23 May 89 First Edition p 2*

[Letter by Ye. Krokhaleva, T. Gorelkina, T. Shmarina and others (a total of 170 signatures of wives of officers and warrant officers of a tank training regiment), GSFG: "We Greatly Hope for Help"]

[Text] Dear Editors! We read in your newspaper about problems connected with withdrawing troops from groups of Soviet forces abroad and cannot help but write about our pain. Those problems seem to us to be "little flowers" in comparison with what awaits us. We will not go deeply into detail such as, for example, over containers for household goods, although they now come to us without hinges, without doors and without floors. There are more troubling things.

The military unit in which our husbands serve is to be withdrawn from GDR territory in June of this year. Meetings were held in the unit at all possible levels, from the regimental commander to representatives of the group of forces political directorate. It was announced that we are leaving for one of the garrisons of the Volga Military District and that the military post does not have any of the most basic housing conditions for families to live there. All we can be assigned are ten apartments, while there are hundreds of families in our regiment.

In late April Lt Col M. Yuldashev, a representative of the regiment, traveled to that very garrison to which the regiment is being sent. He told us that the school on post is in emergency condition and is designed for 600 places.

There are already 1,400 children studying in it, and we will add at least another 500. What is to happen with our children? What knowledge will they be able to obtain under such conditions?

The Volga Military District command authority requested Lt Col Yuldashev to pass on to us that women with children should travel wherever they can (whoever has that opportunity), since we can be assigned only tents at the new location. It turns out we are forced to seek shelter from our relatives, but many of us do not even have that opportunity.

We realize that a reduction of the Armed Forces and removal of troops from GDR territory is a very important and necessary matter. From the political standpoint we of course support this with all our hearts, but we do not understand at all why people must suffer. The fact is that the decision on the withdrawal was not made yesterday or today.

We say and write a very great deal, including in your newspaper, about an attentive and sensitive attitude toward people and about an individual approach to every Soviet citizen. Well, just where is this individual approach with respect to our families? We greatly hope for your help.

From the Editors. We assigned Lt Col O. Bedula, our permanent correspondent for the Volga Military District, to clarify the substance of the problem at hand.

"As of today," said Lt Gen V. Filippov, member of military council and chief of political directorate of the Volga Military District, in a conversation with the correspondent, "there have been 36 apartments reserved for families arriving in Garrison X of our district. A new 40-apartment house will be turned over in June and (such a decision has been made) will be entirely filled by families of servicemen arriving from the GSFG. It is planned to build another 80 apartments by year's end. In addition, families of the regiment being redeployed are being given 100 rooms in two dormitories. We calculate that in time a certain number of other apartments will become free which presently are occupied by officers and warrant officers of another unit. They also will be turned over to families of the regiment being withdrawn from the GSFG. With regard to the school, the situation here is really very serious. At the present time we are looking for an opportunity to solve this problem."

Well, just how does it come out as a result? With the most optimistic forecast, a little over 70 percent of all the families of officers and warrant officers arriving from the GSFG will have a roof over their heads by the end of the year. Just how will the housing problem be resolved for the other families? The editors hope to receive an answer to this question from appropriate officials. In no instance can people be allowed to remain in a situation such as is taking shape today, judging from the information cited.

Reprise on Departmental Barriers to Aviation Operations

18010655 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
4 May 89 First Edition p 1

[Article by Col A. Andryushkov: "Contrasts" or "Why Aircraft Crews Continue to Encounter Unjustified Difficulties at 'Strange' Airfields"]

[Text] Several years ago KRASNAYA ZVEZDA began a study of the problem of providing support for the vital functioning of flight crews making flights with landings at airfields under the jurisdiction of different departments (the article "Barriers" in the 8 June 1986 issue of the newspaper and "Once Again About Barriers" in the 26 November 1987 issue). The newspaper articles evoked a broad public response, specific steps were taken, and appropriate documents were issued.

Our special correspondent, who took part in a flight along with the crews of SU-27 interceptors, tells about the changes which have occurred during the intervening period.

Aircraft work hard in the sky. Like people, they become fatigued. There comes a time when some of the winged machines remain on the ground: the state of their "health" prevents them from taking off. These aircraft end up in the concerned hands of ground specialists. Some of the aircraft need only to be inspected at the site to be permitted to fly again, while others need a thorough inspection at repair enterprises. This is where the ferrying comes in.

After having operated conscientiously in the air for some time, the flight of SU-27 interceptors still had the flying capacity to ensure crew safety while ferrying them from the unit to a repair enterprise. The "blue flashes," as the SU-27s are called for their sky-blue color and flight speed, were being ferried by military pilots 1st class Lt Col Ye. Pishchelko, Lt Col V. Romanenko, Maj M. Romanov and Capt A. Gribov.

An An-72 aircraft with an outstanding team of ground specialists aboard was assigned to support the flight (a minimum of three landing would have to be made at intermediate airfields to support the flight of several thousand kilometers). The senior specialist was Maj L. Blender, deputy commander of an Air Force Engineer Service squadron. The An-72 commander was Maj I. Ivchik, military pilot 1st class. His second-in-command was Lt V. Osipov.

The An-72 took off first. The duty teams of the Unified Air Traffic Control system would monitor the flight. I want to say at the start that the crews had no complaints about the performance of those in charge in the YeS UVD [Unified Air Traffic Control System] during the entire flight. The precise handling of requests, efficiency in deciding flight questions and the timely notification of the crews on changes contributed to the successful accomplishment of the important mission.

It was minus 59 degrees on board at altitude 9,100 meters. The crew in the cockpit wore light jackets. All of the systems were operating flawlessly. The automatic equipment would indicate any change in conditions. Capt V. Pavlovskiy, aircraft engineer, was monitoring the set of instruments for the two turbojet engines. His right-hand man was WO Ye. Lutsein, aircraft mechanic.

The route flown by the An-72 was within the jurisdiction of the Air Defense Forces. The pilots were in good spirits; they were under that department, and we know that things are always easier among one's own. Past articles have discussed how difficult it is to overcome departmental barriers.

The unit in which Lt Col V. Anokhin serves was aware the aircraft were coming. The equipment had been detailed in advance for taking care of them, and a bus was ready to transport the crew members. When he received the request from Maj Ivchik for the next leg of the flight, the air dispatch officer reported that rooms had been reserved at a hotel. Everything was going according to plan. It could be said that progress had been made since the ordeals described in previous articles.

The joy was short-lived, however. A half-hour passed, and Maj Ivchik did not know who was to guard the aircraft. The An-72 was left for the night with no one to look after it. The same fate awaited the flight of SU-27s. For 2 hours Lt Col Peshchelko was unable to find the duty officer for the unit parking area responsible for guarding the combat aircraft. And this airfield was indicated in the documents as one of the main ferrying support airfields. Hundreds of crews passed through it last year, for example. How were they met and supported there? Many facts forced me to think about this.

The next morning, for example, the technical crew went to the airfield to ready the SU-27s for takeoff. There were many things to do, and it was dusk before the work was completed. The personnel, chilled to the bone, could only think of getting warm and sleeping a few hours to be ready for the flight. There was no vehicle to haul them from the airfield, however. In vain Lt Col Peshchelko kept the telephone line hot, trying to locate Maj A. Bezhan, commander of the separate airfield technical maintenance battalion, in order to arrange for transportation and arrange for the pilots and technicians to be fed. Too late for the evening meal and losing hope of getting any kind of transportation, the airmen decided to get there on their own. It was around 10 kilometers to the hotel. When they reached the main road and boarded a rayon soviet bus, they avoided the eyes of the other passengers; the soaked and tired airmen did not look the best.

After a bite of cold, dry food, whatever each happened to have (in-flight rations are not provided for fighters, and the "nz" [emergency rations] tucked into the parachutes are for survival, should the airmen have to eject) and placing their wet footwear against the radiators, they lay down to sleep. Military airmen are conditioned by their

way of life to sleep without dreaming; their heads touch the pillow, and they are gone. One would think that with nerves like that they could fly until old age. At the age of 35, however, they enter a hospital for a complete physical with trepidation, afraid of telling the doctor too much and being taken off flight status....

They say that a situation looks better after sleeping on it. For 4 hours the crews racked their brains for a way to get to the airfield. There was no point in looking for Maj Bezhan, and Sr Lt M. Mursalimov, duty officer, just kept encouraging them with promises that the bus would arrive any minute. It is possible that he himself was being deceived.

The bus finally arrived. It was worse than no bus at all! Pvt M. Kharko, military driver, wore himself out stopping to repair something on the bus every 100 meters. It took almost 2 hours for the bus to cover 10 kilometers, and it did not even make it to the dispatcher. Luck was with them; a truck came by on its way to the airfield. I can imagine how worried the YeS UVD officers were, not knowing what had happened to the SU-27 crews, as the flight authorization time was running out.

The aircraft were not ready for takeoff. The special equipment for readying the fighters, which Maj Splender had ordered in advance, had not arrived. When asked why, WO V. Ivanov, senior member of the group, answered: "That is your problem." The needed equipment did not show up at the airfield until the regimental commander intervened personally. But does the unit commander always intervene in matters of flight support? No, of course not. If he did, he would not have time to perform his main duties.

Just why is this attitude taken there toward carrying out the transit flight support instructions? Lt Col V. Gamzyuk, deputy regimental commander, explained it somewhat:

"It is not possible for the battalion commander to see to the regiment's combat training work and simultaneously handle the transit flights. We should have a commandant's

office to handle these matters, but it is located elsewhere, on the territory of the Ministry of Civil Aviation. Why there? Because fighters and other ordinary aircraft usually land at a military airfield. Liners carrying important officials ordinarily land at an airfield of the Ministry of Civil Aviation. They have to be received and seen off. There are no hitches with this...."

Just whom are we fooling with our sham? And how weighty an order do we need to rectify things?

I have discussed this incident in such detail because I see from what would appear to be an isolated case that it is not at all a matter of departmental barriers but one of personal responsibility on the part of each person in charge for order at his station. With this report I want to underscore the fact that the problem will not be resolved with strict orders issued at a higher level, but through the efforts of the command element of the specific departments utilizing the aviation. We could see this also from two ferrying flights with landings: one at a long-range aviation airfield; the second, also at an airfield under the jurisdiction of the Air Defense Forces.

Night flights were underway at the long-range airfield where Lt Col K. Baydzhigitov serves. The people had enough concerns without our five aircraft, but the airfield was specified in the documents for a landing by the transit aircraft. Everything possible had been done to rule out the slightest hitch in their support. The airmen did not separate things into "ours" and "theirs." We experienced the same concerned attitude also at the airfield of the Air Defense Forces where Lt Col Yu. Rusanov serves. The people handled the problem, even though, I am confident, it was not easy for them; they still lack many things needed to fully meet the requirements for organizing and supporting transit flights.

...The SU-27 crews successfully reached their destination. They set out on the return trip some time later. Airfields under what departments would receive the airmen this time?

British Destroyer Visits Leningrad

*18010592a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
30 May 89 First Edition p 3*

[TASS report: "English Sailors in Leningrad"]

[Text] Leningrad, 29 May (TASS)—Over the last few days thousands of Leningrad inhabitants have toured the destroyer "Bristol" of the British Royal Naval Forces. It has stopped in our country for a 5-day official friendly visit under the personal flag of Vice Admiral G.F. Kovard, commander of the 1st Flotilla.

The commander of the crossing [perekhod] visited the Leningrad Higher Naval School imeni M.V. Frunze and met with the staff of professors and instructors.

The guests from the United Kingdom visited the Piskarevskiy Memorial Cemetery and laid a wreath to honor the memory of those who died during the blockade. They also visited the cruiser "Aurora" and toured the sights of Leningrad and its suburbs.

Admiral V.A. Samoylov, commander of the Order of the Red Banner Leningrad Naval Base, held a reception on the occasion of the visit by the British Naval Forces ship.

A press conference was held aboard the "Bristol." Vice Adm G.F. Kovard noted that the friendship between the sailors of the United Kingdom and the USSR has its origins in the years of World War II, when ships of the Royal Naval Forces escorted Soviet transports with

weapons, ammunition, and equipment to Murmansk. We consider the arrival of the British sailors a step in the direction of a renewal of relations and a development of contacts between the armed forces of the two countries.

Pacific Fleet Coastal Defense Exercise Announced

*18010592b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
30 May 89 First Edition p 3*

[Report: "In the USSR Armed Forces"]

[Text] From 10 to 12 June of this year the forces of the Pacific Fleet will conduct an exercise with the goal of perfecting the defense of the Soviet coast.

Participating in the exercise will be 20 combatant ships and crafts and 37 airplanes and helicopters. About 10,000 people will take part.

The government of the USSR wishes to demonstrate good will on the issue of confidence-building measures for naval influence in the area of the Pacific Ocean and seeks to promote an atmosphere of mutual understanding between the USSR and the countries of the Pacific Ocean region. To that end it has invited to the exercise in the capacity of observers representatives of the naval forces of several states in the region: the People's Republic of China, the People's Democratic Republic of Korea, the United States, Japan, Canada, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, India, Australia, New Zealand, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines.

**Decree Removing Border, Internal, Railroad
Troops From Ministry of Defense**
18010663 Moscow *VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO
SOVETA SOYUZA SOVETSKIKH
SOTSIALISTICHESKIKH RESPUBLIK* in Russian
No 12 (2502) 22 Mar 89 p 136

[Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, issued on 21 March by M. Gorbachev, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and T. Menteleshashvili, Secretary of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet: "Article 86. On the Removal From the Composition of the USSR Armed Forces of the Border, Internal, and Railroad Troops"]

[Text] With the purpose of bringing the composition of the USSR Armed Forces into full compliance with the goals and functions established by the USSR Constitution, for the execution of which the USSR Armed Forces were created, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet **resolves**:

1. To remove from the composition of the USSR Armed Forces border, internal, and railroad troops.
2. To establish that universal military service applies to citizens serving in border, internal, and railroad troops as well as in the USSR Armed Forces.
3. To establish for border, internal, and railroad troops the same procedures, conditions, and durations of service and manpower acquisition as for the Soviet Army and Navy.

To maintain for the border, internal, and railroad troops their current order of logistic and financial support.

4. To commission the USSR Council of Ministers to review questions arising from the present Decree and, when necessary, to submit proposals to the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

5. For the USSR Ministry of Defense and the USSR Ministry of Justice, concerning questions arising from the present Decree, to propose in the manner established by law amendments to the USSR Law "On Universal Military Service" and other legislative acts of the USSR.

**New Deputy Sees Need for Reorganization of
Construction Troops**

18010681 Moscow *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* in Russian
23 May 89 First Edition p 1

[Interview with Lt Col Boris Filippovich Pylin, people's deputy of the USSR for Sovetskiy Territorial Election District No 139 of the city of Volgograd, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA stringer Maj V. Salmin; date and place not specified, under rubric "People's Deputies of the USSR Have the Floor": "On the Cutting Edge of Perestroyka"]

[Text] On the eve of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR our stringer Maj V. Salmin met with Lt Col B. Pylin, people's deputy of the USSR for Sovetskiy Territorial Election District No 139 of the city of Volgograd, and asked him to respond to a number of questions.

[Salmin] Boris Filippovich, I know that the electors gave you a large number of instructions, some of which you already have begun to implement. Yesterday, for example, you were in the oblast trade union council. What were you deciding there?

[Pylin] A letter addressed to me came from the city of Kalach-on-Don, from Citizen Petrushina. It is about instances where Czech customs illegally confiscated goods purchased by a group of Soviet tourists in the GDR and CSSR. I had occasion to meet with the chief of the oblast trade union council Soviet tourism department and asked that he provide information about this. I prepared the text of an official letter. During the work of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR I will make a deputy's query in the USSR Council of Ministers. I hope to solve this problem positively.

[Salmin] I see on your desk three of today's letters from residents of a house on ulitsa Kachintsev. What are the people requesting?

[Pylin] They have very different requests: repair an apartment, install a telephone, settle some conflict, and so on. A deputy does not have the right to refuse a request to solve some kind of everyday problem, but one also cannot fully home in on this. I believe that in such cases a people's deputy of the USSR must rely on the support of deputies of local soviets, of whom we have over 1,500 in the Sovetskiy Election District. Often the parties do not know each other, however, and a paradoxical picture results: people are tormented by their troubles and look for high-ranking officials, while deputies of local soviets invested with powers are bored during receiving hours.

[Salmin] And how can one extricate himself from this vicious circle?

[Pylin] I believe that deputies of rayon, city and oblast soviets of people's deputies must give up an armchair style of work and go meet people, have more frequent contact with electors, visit their apartments, and find out and take note of all needs and suggestions. For example, I already have had 78 meetings with electors in a machinebuilding plant, in the Agropromsnab [APK supply committee], in an SPTU [agricultural vocational-technical school], in a military construction detachment, and in various city establishments and organizations.

[Salmin] In what directions do you intend to perform your work as a deputy?

[Pylin] Its basis is work in the election district and locally, and generalization of electors' instructions going to the statewide level. We must seriously look into all bills being prepared or which already have been brought up for discussion. We must get down to the substance of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium decree recently published in PRAVDA on draft general principles for

restructuring the leadership of the economic and social sphere in union republics based on an expansion of their sovereign rights, self-government and self-financing.

[Salmin] Just what is your social position and fundamental platform, Boris Filippovich?

[Pylin] I will say frankly that the important thing now is to strip ministries and departments of unlimited power, pass the reins of government locally to soviets of people's deputies, and create a new structure for forming the state budget. We have to look thoroughly into problems of the village. Alas, today the proprietor of the land still is the kolkhoz chairman and not the village council. The most painful problem is housing. I have made a study for its cardinal resolution. A year ago I took this question to higher echelons unsuccessfully. Now I am full of resolve to implement my program. Its basis is the establishment of an individual-housing construction industry. I also have variants of bills on ecology.

[Salmin] As an officer, you could not help but take account of those questions which trouble servicemen. Take perestroika in the Armed Forces. What problems trouble you most of all? What specific proposals have matured for discussion at the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR?

[Pylin] I favor further perestroika of the Armed Forces; their adequate, planned reduction; democratization of Army life; and granting unit commanders greater independence in resolving personnel, administrative and economic questions. The Army needs that organization and establishment which would give combat subunits an opportunity to breathe freely and to do the work for which they are specifically intended. All supply matters must be made the exclusive responsibility of support subunits. I deem it necessary to reorganize the authorized structure of military construction troops, reduce the "superstructure" of the management staff, give Ministry of Defense construction units and industrial enterprises economic independence, and broadly introduce modern forms of labor organization, lease relationships, and elements of cooperation.

At the congress I will defend the idea of establishing a commission in the USSR Supreme Soviet to combat protectionism in the Army and Navy, as well as a special commission on defense matters. It should be assigned in particular to monitor the expenditure of funds for military needs, prepare important bills concerning the Armed Forces, and ensure social and legal protection of servicemen.

Inability of CD to Cope with Natural, Production Disasters

*18010616 Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA
in Russian 8 Apr 89 p 4*

[Article by Vyacheslav Baskov: "Civil Defense: Against Whom?"]

[Text] What will be at the end of the world? Will anyone survive it?

For the most part, truly intelligent people are pessimists. They believe except for saving their soul. More simple people, for whom a violent storm is the voice of God, just tremble from talk about the end of the world, but deep in their souls hope there is somewhere to escape to. But it is written in the Bible that not all will perish at the fatal moments. The sealed will remain. Well, you know, righteous men. As the Bible maintains, there will be "an hundred and forty and four thousand..." of these righteous men.

Only 144,000! Why, there are almost 9 million residents in Moscow alone....

However, the theorists of our civil defense went farther than the Bible in their incorrigible optimism, convinced that those who go to civil defense classes can be saved. Every person must learn how to behave at the fatal moments and know how to help his comrade. Let's say, you have to run away from ammonia and lock yourself in the basement, but with chlorine the opposite is true, you go to the attic. Were you told about this?...

You still have to live to see what is predicted in the Bible! But suddenly that time is now, at these very minutes, will the light grow dim for a quite small group of people? Or perhaps it will grow dim for some other reason? For example, for passengers of a regular subway car. B. Nikiforov, deputy USSR minister of railways, and V. Pakhomov, chief of the Subways Main Administration, have been striving in every way possible to have subway cars made of non-combustible plastic on the inside. Here is the situation. Today, the Moscow Subway does not have artificial ventilation; therefore, if a car catches fire somewhere in the tunnel, the passengers hardly have a chance of making it out to the blessed light. The righteous and the sinners will suffocate together.

The USSR Civil Defense [CD] Headquarters regularly compiles a summary of incidents, natural disasters, and accidents—similar to the summary of yesterday's crimes compiled by the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. One reminds you of the other, since both contain victims, descriptions, and witnesses. However, it is much more apparent from the CD summary that man is subduing nature, and nature is subduing man. We all know that man still will not win, no matter how educated he becomes, no matter what machines a clever person

thinks up. Matter, we learned, is eternal and everlasting. We are against it—mere mortals. Really, mere mortal conquerors of nature, it turns out, are not at all ready for accidents!

As if confirming this, Viktor Mikhaylovich Kozhbahteyev, chief of the USSR Civil Defense Headquarters, showed me a picture taken in Arzamas on 4 June 1988 during the sadly famous railway explosion... The photographer was standing on the street leading to the station. In the photo—it was summer, the narrow street was bathed in sunlight, and along the sidewalks were trees which shaded the asphalt nicely. At the end of the narrow street was the low station building. Behind the station, no, above the station, a powerful mushroom cloud formed by the explosion was rushing toward the sky itself.

"Look here," Col Gen Kozhbahteyev said.

He was pointing to people who at that moment were walking along the green narrow street as if nothing had happened: a woman with two shopping bags; a young man in a short-sleeve shirt... The woman was heading toward the station, and the young man was walking behind it... They, of course, heard the explosion and saw some kind of column of fire and smoke ahead, beyond the station. Something there had certainly exploded. But the passers-by did not react at all to it.

But you see, at that instant, three cars exploded, killing 91 people and injuring 250. The blast wave caused irreparable damage to 190 houses, which will have to be demolished, and completely destroyed 170. Material damage was 100 million rubles.

It is possible that, several minutes later, concerned passers-by finally realized what had happened and ran back to the photographer. But the picture captured the moment of the people's most complete lack of readiness for the extreme situation that developed beyond the neighboring house and on the railway. And such situations crop up continually on the tracks.

On 16 August 1988, in the vicinity of Berezayka Station between Moscow and Leningrad, 12 cars of a high-speed train were derailed; 29 people died and 104 were injured.

On 4 October 1988, two cars with explosives took off into the air at the Sverdlovsk Sorting Yard Station. There were 4 people killed and 118 injured, including 9 children; more than 1,000 people needed medical assistance.

Trains derail in February and March 1989 at Yaroslavl and in Lithuania, people die, fires break out, buildings are destroyed, fuel is spilled on the ground... The accidents continue! But is someone preparing us for them? How to behave? In what direction to run?

At the USSR Civil Defense Headquarters, they believe that explosive and toxic substances destined for shipment are being packed poorly in the special cars and tanks, but the servicing personnel do not know the safety techniques. The USSR CD Headquarters proposes not allowing trains with hazardous materials to pass through major populated points. But so far no one has listened to the proposal. The thing is, the major populated areas themselves also require ammonia, chlorine, heptyl, and fuel oil.

Who would have thought that the harmless-looking fruit and vegetable bases, meat packing plants, and freezer plants where they make ice cream are extremely hazardous establishments? You see, the refrigeration units run on ammonia. On the territory of Taganskiy Rayon alone there are located a meat packing plant, a freezer plant, a rayon fruit and vegetable association, and the Moscow Fat Combine. And the Rayon CD Headquarters considers each of them a "chemically hazardous facility," since their daily reserve of ammonia is 25, 10, 6.4, and 7.5 tons, respectively. The Refrigeration Combine No. 8 is located in Kiyevskiy Rayon of Moscow; it has a continuous ammonia supply of 10.5 tons. There is also the Brewery imeni Badayev and three rail lines over which cars with chemically hazardous cargo merrily dash about. In February of this year, they managed to shut down the refrigeration combine for repairs, which they had been unable to do in 5 years. But prior to that, three times it discharged into the atmosphere its hazardous raw materials, paralyzing lungs. However, many rayon CD headquarters have on their walls homemade maps indicating the "chemically hazardous facilities," the radius of their effect in the event of an accident, and arrows indicating where to withdraw the population. But have they told you what "chemically hazardous facilities" are located nearby and in what directions to flee from them in case of an accident? Or are you still not in the effective radius of glasnost?...

It is time to say, our civil defense began working only recently, in July 1987, on defending the peaceful population from progress on the railroad and at combines where they make ice cream, sausages, and cutlets and where they store fruits and vegetables. Prior to this, CD was oriented on saving the population exclusively from an enemy air attack. The new, more open orientation of civil defense has suddenly discovered its quite poor state of being equipped with modern equipment that is absolutely necessary for assisting the population during peacetime. This time, besides the regular railroad accidents, the headquarters' summary characterizes the explosions at various enterprises, fires in grain storage facilities, pigpens, and docks, outbreaks of epidemics among animals and people, and also phenomena of an unfriendly nature. In February 1989, the Ebeko Volcano near Severo-Kurilsk came to life again; there were snow avalanches northeast of Dushanbe; there was a mud flow in the village of Abkugeta, Kedskiy Rayon, Georgian SSR; and there was an earthquake 50 km southeast of Frunze—and almost always and everywhere, children

and adults perish, entire villages are wiped out. Our population, exactly like the population of other countries, needs help continuously! However, civil defense is still just learning its new, noble trade.

According to official reports of the USSR CD Headquarters itself, its regiments and militarized subunits, jointly with other organizations, pulled out from under the rubble of collapsed buildings in Armenia 39,724 people, 15,254 of whom remained alive. All the foreign rescue groups together, amounting to 1,148 people and 100 of their search dogs, returned life to 60 citizens. These figure comparisons sing a hymn of the selflessness of troop CD subunits, but the report itself, the CD Headquarters chief himself, and the rank-and-file workers at CD staffs complain about their lack of modern rescue equipment, while the foreign rescuers who flew into Armenia from all around the world had devices for detecting live people in the ruins, mini-tractors, saws for cutting the concrete, stone, and reinforcement, and special jacks. Our bulky cranes grimaced under the weight of the collapsed walls and ceilings and retreated in face of the disorderly pile of concrete slabs.

The procedure for withdrawing the populace from the disaster areas also has not been fully developed. Were you ever told that at the moment of the earthquake people were supposed to jump out of the house and run away from it to a distance equal to its height plus 5-10 meters? In short, the farther, the better. Easy to say—jump out! It is likely that residents of multistoried buildings in Leninakan also would not have been adverse to carrying out this simple instruction, but the path down turned out to be painfully long. Nevertheless, the book of instructions for the population, "Know and Be Able To Do!", recommends "before leaving the apartment (house) or work place," shutting off the electricity and gas, putting out the fire in the stove, and taking along with you "necessary things, documents, a supply of food, medicine" and only then "go out to the street." I am convinced that all this must be done. If only it were true, as is written in "Know and Be Able To Do!", that people always receive "advance warning" about the threat of an earthquake. There is no doubt that Col Sergey Nikulayevich Semenov and Col Valerian Vasilievich Spirin from the USSR CD Headquarters, who wrote the book of instructions, were guided by the best motives: to calm the readers and moderate their fear of capricious nature. But, by writing what was cited above, they achieved the opposite effect.

There is a complete lack of equipment for rescuing nursery- and kindergarten-aged children from natural disasters, catastrophes, and accidents. The evacuation of the population, say, from clouds of ammonia or chlorine has been developed both by routes and in principle (thus, one should always move into the wind away from the cloud of ammonia with its volatile molecules), while the bus or truck is coming to the kindergarten, v. i.e. the children are being loaded...

In the above-mentioned Taganskiy Rayon of the capital, with its multistoried micro-rayons and 250 institutions, the CD Headquarters does not have the capability to print elementary leaflets with instructions on reasonable rules of conduct in an emergency situation—there is no paper, no printing press. What are you supposed to do when we hear the continuous siren? Do you know? Have you been told that you are supposed to turn on the radio immediately? Understanding the sirens and the announcements over the radio—this is the ABC's of civil defense. But neither the All-Union Radio nor the Central Television are involved in these issues at all. No one other than the workers themselves at the civil defense headquarters are involved in civil defense at all. They are artificially cut off from the world at their headquarters, and builders do not even ask for their opinions.

The CD Headquarters of Kiyevskiy Rayon in Moscow invited me to the acceptance of a shelter which had been built at a new building of a respectable association. It was designed for 250 associates of this respected institution. The deputy chief of the CD Headquarters, Vitaliy Petrovich Sarafanov, discovered that only enough air was being supplied into shelter for 230 people, not 250.

"If something were to happen, we would have even fewer people in here!" exclaimed the charming Galina Alekseyevna Lazaridi, deputy general director of the association. "Cuts are being made everywhere, you understand. None of us, believe me, knows how to build these shelters!"

The earthquake in Armenia brought to light even more serious mistakes by the builders. We found out too late that the ceiling panel must not simply lay on the four walls, but be welded to them. Because this was not done, the Leninakan skyscrapers folded like houses of cards.

Is your house built correctly? Was its design coordinated with CD specialists?

However, as was already said, the CD workers themselves do not understand very well what is required of them in peacetime. The absolutely unscientific myth about the predictability of earthquakes is not only alive in the booklet "Know and Be Able To Do!", but is actively propagandized. Owing to this, Semipalatinsk Oblast was gripped by panic in February 1989. It was shamelessly caused by local CD employees who made a 3-minute emergency announcement over television about a 5- to 7-point earthquake that was supposedly imminent and that, moreover, would be accompanied by hurricanes, snowdrifts, and (tremble, residents!) flooding of Semipalatinsk itself! The doomed residents simply did not know which way to go. At that time they still did not believe that they had 24 hours to turn off the gas and electricity, to gather things, documents, and medicine, and to run out of their home (work place). The next day, from the same TV screen, the chief of the local CD

headquarters, N. Zhdanov, calmly reported that the report the day before was a testing of a new system for warning the population about natural disasters.

The lucky residents of Semipalatinsk: they had a whole 24 hours. In March of this year in the city of Dzhizak, K. Ochilov, a dispatcher at the water canal, received from the duty officer at the Oblast CD Headquarters, P. Smolich, this horrifying telegram: "According to information from the seismic station, we have received a report from the Uzbek SSR Institute of Seismology: a 7- to 8-point earthquake is expected in the next 2-3 hours in Dzhizak." A general lack of education made the entire city, including the telephone operators, without wasting time, to dash into the streets; teachers ran from the schools, overtaking the students; workers rushed like mad to the kindergartens and nurseries for the children... The next day, the party obkom buro punished the oblast CD chief, O. Koshevoy, and his deputy, A. Sorokin, for the false alarm, arranged, as it turned out, to test the population's readiness for earthquakes. Incidentally, the author of an article about this incident in a republic newspaper bitterly notes that the evacuation plan, drawn up in the warm offices of the headquarters with its drawn maps, was not initiated at the moment of the false alarm; people ran from houses, dropping everything, and rushed faster than they could think from their work places to get out of harm's way...

Of course, it is too bad that first-grader Denis Li from the city of Dzhizak, who was unceremoniously knocked off his feet by educated teachers (incorrigible pessimists) and more agile friends in their uncontrollable desire to live. Because of this, the poor kid was taken to the hospital with a brain concussion (strangely, the hospital was still operating). But the greatest pity of all is the people so absurdly injured, maimed, and innocently killed from real, but not training, earthquakes, explosions, and fires. If they had not been gripped by fear and panic, if they had known how to behave, they may have remained alive and unharmed?

This is not a rhetorical question. Education of the population depends completely on the workers of the CD staffs, who since July 1987 still have not declassified everything.

The duty janitor of the Taganskiy Rayispolkom, mentioned more than once already, gave the appearance that he did not know where the CD headquarters was located—it is classified. The secretary of rayispolkom chairman N. Shadmanov, alluding to some instruction from above, flatly refused to give the telephone number of this secret headquarters. We had a quarrel over this minor thing. It was difficult to grasp the reason for such secrecy: every person should have the telephone number of the CD headquarters, such as "01," "02," "03," or "04"! What happens if a person notices something—where is he to call? Secret, secret, everything in civil

defense is a secret, as if civil defense was created not for defending the population, but so that the population would not learn all the secrets of surviving.

This is absurd, of course. Civil defense was conceived precisely to save lives. But why is it so inept and clumsy? The CD Headquarters of Proletarskiy Rayon of Moscow published a leaflet with the ABC's of warning signals. The poor Plant imeni Likhachev was able to find paper and a printing press. But do you think that these wonderful leaflets ended up in the mailbox of every apartment? Of course not. There was not enough scraps of paper for everyone. The leaflet is posted only in certain stores. People have more to do than just stand at the wall craning their neck to read beads of valuable instructions,

especially when returning from work. Meanwhile, it is possible that we would not need CD exercises at all with a sickly economy isolated from production if the essentially simple science of civil defense were opened up in leaflets and scattered in mailboxes. Declassify the telephone numbers. Make open access to other now-inaccessible headquarters that gather interesting information and statistics, summarize experience, and develop new recommendations for fighting the adversities. The super-secrecy and isolation of CD workers from the population have freed them from public monitoring and makes open discussion of the problems concerning each of us more difficult. This, as we can see, has not added to both sides' knowledge in the area of overcoming misfortunes, which do not always fall from the sky....

Belorussian Gosplan Chairman on Defense Conversion
18010595 Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 19 Apr 89 p 2

[Article by Novosti Press Agency correspondent V. Khodosovskiy under the rubric "Goods for the People": "We Are Reforging Swords Into Plowshares": How the Conversion of Defense Enterprises Is Proceeding in the Republic"]

[Text] The first nuclear missiles have been turned over for scrap. The government has approved a program for converting a number of operating enterprises of the defense industry branches to the production of consumer goods. APN [Novosti Press Agency] correspondent V. Khodosovskiy tells how this is being accomplished in Belorussia.

The Termoplast plant is almost in the center of Minsk. I cannot say that the journalists did not know the way there, but the enterprise was affiliated with the defense branch of one of the ministries, and there was limited glasnost pertaining to its operation. What about today?

...I visited the plant's shop for consumer goods production. It has produced them for more than 10 years now, an average of around 25 different items annually. And all that time the production volume has been increasing. Today, 1 ruble and 73 kopecks worth of consumer goods is produced per ruble of wage fund at Termoplast. Compare this with 80 kopecks per ruble at nonspecialized civilian enterprises in Belorussia.

"All enterprises of the defense sector in the region have produced consumer goods since the mid-70s," said Vyacheslav Frantsevich Kebich, chairman of the republic Gosplan. "The Coordinating Council for the Production of Consumer Goods of the Belorussian SSR and the Baltic Republics was established at that time and is still functioning (Moldavia joined it later). Its authority extended also to defense enterprises. Household equipment, television and radioelectronic equipment, cameras and electronic watches account for the bulk of civilian production at the region's defense plants. They produced a total of more than 1.7 billion rubles worth of consumer goods in 1988. Their average annual growth rate has amounted to 10.3% during the current 5-year period."

...It is not all so simple with the conversion from defense to civilian products, however. The assembly lines were obviously standing idle in the Termoplast shops. The production engineer who accompanied me explained that there were not enough assembly electric motors.

"Then even the defense branches, which were considered outside the sphere of the usual economic problems, suffer the same lack of coordination of reciprocal ties and the same shortage of materials, capacities and assembly parts?" I asked Kebich.

"Naturally, the defense branches do not operate in a vacuum. And although in this specific case the breakdown in the production of washing machines is the fault of a Union ministry not connected to defense, the region's military enterprises also have their problems. Certain leaders regard consumer goods as something secondary, for example."

"Are there realistic prospects for eliminating them?"

"First of all, it is important to stress the fact that the cover of secrecy does not isolate these enterprises from the restructuring. The conversion decision adopted by the government will not only help to enrich our shelves with new goods, but will also change the attitude that assignments for consumer goods production are an inconvenient makeweight. The conversion of consumer goods sections to economic accountability and the introduction of more flexible methods of organizing production will be accelerated, including those involving cooperatives and the establishment of small sections with flexibility for altering the assortment."

"The higher technological level of equipment of the defense production operations and the skilled cadres, as well as the production discipline, provides a basis for hoping that real progress will be achieved. Particularly since specific programs have been outlined."

"What will be added to the selection of consumer goods by the conversion underway in the region?"

"First of all, we should anticipate movement in the production of goods incorporating computers and electronic equipment. The schools are already familiar with our Korvet sets of equipment for computer rooms. They are in extremely short supply, however, and their production will be increased. In addition, the development of a new set, the Nemiga, has been completed. It will go into regular production this year. The development of modern personal computers compatible with the Unified System EVM [electronic computer] programs and components is underway and will go into production within the next few years. Cooperating with civilian enterprises, the defense production facilities will be able to increase the output of home refrigerators. It is planned to set up the production of small diesel engines for mini-tractors. Preparations are underway for producing laser sound pickups for digital laser record players, and in the future, in cooperation with other enterprises, the record players themselves."

"Enterprises of the former USSR Ministry of the Light and Food Industry, which was unable to produce quality equipment for processing products of the fields and farms, were recently turned over to defense branches."

"The new 'sponsored' units are not a gift to the defense industry workers, of course. With the help of their developed scientific and planning and design base, however, the situation can be improved. In the Belorussian

region, for example, they have already begun developing fundamentally new types of comprehensive production assemblies based on the latest technological achievements. The plans for the defense enterprises contain 68 types of equipment for the initial processing of livestock and poultry, 41 types of production equipment for the secondary processing of meat, and other equipment.

"Everything would indicate that the government's decision is not diverging from the reality."

"I believe that the consumers will be able to see this for themselves soon."

Military Resources Aid Civilian Economy

Rural Road Construction

*18010654 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
1 May 89 First Edition p 1*

[Article by Col N. Grigoryev under the rubric "With the Same Concerns as the People": "And the Villages Will Come to Life"]

[Text] When I was in the road construction subunits I noticed the interest with which local residents followed the work of the soldiers. Roads are truly needed, the same as air, there in the Nonchernozem Zone of the RSFSR.

This year the soldiers will build more than 500 kilometers of roads. It is not an easy task, considering the fact that most of the subunits are still poorly equipped. Things are moving along, however. The military road construction workers commanded by Lt Col A. Chernyy, Col A. Lavrov, Lt Col V. Glaznov, Maj Yu. Kashkin and Capt A. Kirichenko meet their targets despite the difficulties.

Time passes, the asphalt ribbons of roads will stretch between the settlements and cities of the Russian Nonchernozem Zone, and the depopulated villages will come to life.

Civilian Products From Military Enterprises

[Article by Sr Lt O. Sgibnev, Volga Military District, under the rubric "With the Same Concerns as the People": "The Plant's New Specialty"]

[Text] Conversion. This word has now come to designate a program for the respecialization of enterprises in the defense industry for the production of consumer goods. Civilian products will comprise up to 60% of the total output of the defense complex by 1995. It is planned to produce 27 billion rubles worth of civilian products at the nation's military enterprises this year, which is 7.5% of the total output of consumer goods.

The military enterprise directed by Col V. Belyayev is among those which have already begun producing consumer goods. Its new products include sets of kitchen furniture.

"Naturally, we had to completely restructure production in order to switch to the output of kitchen furniture," Col V. Belyayev said.

The shop began turning out products literally 2 weeks after the retooling. Sixty sets of kitchen furniture have already been produced. Sales volumes for these products will increase several times over by the end of the year, to 350,000 rubles worth. Everything is not going as smoothly as we would like, however. There are many problems with the retooling of the production process.

The difficulties do not frighten the plant workers, however. They will ultimately be overcome. The new operation promises to benefit both the nation and the enterprise.

"All of the profits from consumer goods production goes to meet our needs," says Vladimir Vasilyevich Belyayev. "We are building a 96-unit apartment building for the plant workers and have allocated additional funds for modernizing the enterprise."

A trade procurement base has already expressed an interest in the military enterprise's new products. An agreement has been concluded for 2,000 sets. The city residents are counting on 6,000 sets. The plant still does not have the capacity to fill all of these orders, of course.

Military Transport Hauls Civilian Cargo

*18010654 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
1 May 89 First Edition p 1*

[Response to question from editors by Col Gen Avn V. Yefanov, commander of the Military Transport Aviation, under the rubric "With the Same Concerns as the People": "Strawberries—on Military Aircraft"]

[Text] Col Gen Avn V. Yefanov, commander of the Military Transport Aviation, responds to a question posed by the editors about what kind of assistance the Military Transport Aviation is providing the national economy.

The main missions of the Military Transport Aviation, as we know, are to support the combat training plan and the vital functioning of the Armed Forces of the USSR. We have also managed to find internal reserves for helping the nation's workers, however. Beginning in May the Military Transport Aviation will provide more extensive assistance to the national economy. Empty training flights have been eliminated, for example. It is useful for the crews to be able also to carry them out with different types of cargo and to become familiar with new regions. I want to stress the fact that the Military Transport Aviation has performed such missions even in the past. There are many examples. They include

Afghanistan, Chernobyl, Armenia.... The crews have performed heroically. Their service is unique: like sailors, they are almost never at home.

We will be hauling food and various types of freight primarily to areas of the Far North and Far East. A new air transport system is being set up to supplement the capabilities of the Ministry of Civil Aviation. Approximately 60 aircraft will be involved. They will haul around 50,000 tons of national economic cargo. Around 70% of the profit from the transport operations will go into the state budget. The USSR Ministry of Defense will use the rest to pay expenses stemming from those operations and as material incentives for the airmen.

Do we have acute problems? It is somehow not customary to talk about them on holidays, of course. I have to say something about housing, however. Thousands of families are without apartments, and living conditions at the garrisons are poor. It is planned also to resolve these problems with the earnings from the transport operations.

I want to see the airmen make a useful and large contribution to the national economy. I would cite just one figure: the value of the transport operations will amount to more than 45 million rubles.

Assisting Armenia

18010654 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
1 May 89 First Edition p 1

[Article by Maj Yu. Artemov under the rubric "With the Same Concerns as the People": "In the Land of Armenia"]

[Text] Like many of my colleagues, I have worked in the area of the natural disaster in Armenia. My notebook contains notes from that time.

The area of destruction contains 21 cities and rayons. More than a half-million residents were left without a roof over their heads. A total of 150 enterprises were shut down. There were 25,000 victims.... I also have some other comments: the army set up 27,600 tents and 180 food supply points. A total of 18,756 servicemen are helping to clear away the rubble....

I made friends with many people. And not just in the military. The entire nation came to the republic's assistance, you see. Addresses are written in various hands on a page: near Moscow, Uzbekistan, the Urals, the Baltic area, the Ukraine, Georgia.... The meetings with people were ordinarily fleeting; minutes were important. They included Sgt Byugar Dzhalilov, an Azerbaijani, and Pvt Bartiyes Tigranyan, an Armenian. They worked together in the ruins. They told me they had saved 17 people during the first 3 days. I can see them clearly even now, months later. They were absolutely exhausted, their hands bleeding. We merely smoked a cigarette together. We had one cigarette for the three and one piece of flat bread, given to me by an elderly Armenian woman. Do you remember that, fellows?

It is no doubt very pretty in Armenia right now. The orchards are in bloom. The earth's wounds are healing over. The military construction workers laid the foundation for the first apartment before my eyes there in Leninakan. There are now dozens of them....

BAM Section Completion

18010654 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
1 May 89 First Edition p 1

[Article by Maj. A. Vorobyev under the rubric "With the Same Concerns as the People": "From Zeysk to Tungala"]

[Text] The military railway workers are to place this last, 156-kilometer complex of the Eastern Section of BAM into permanent operation in September of this year.

The complex consists of three stations, six double-track sections and several settlements. The BAM workers are now engaged in building facilities exclusively for the normal needs of life: erecting apartment buildings, schools, kindergartens and public trade centers. Like all the Soviet people, the military railway workers are concerned about what will become of the railway. Will BAM turn out to be a "road to nowhere," as some journalists have stated?

I asked N. Isingarin, deputy USSR minister of railways, about this. This is what he had to say:

"I want to ease the minds of the transport construction workers. BAM was not a mistake, although many errors were made in its planning and construction. The main line still has prospects, however, it seems to me. This is confirmed by figures which we have. In just 8 years 200 million tons of freight and 22 million passengers have been hauled on the far from completed railroad. A total of 13,000 carloads of freight were hauled on the eastern branch of the route, which the military workers are in the process of building, during the first 4 months of this year alone. This is almost the amount hauled during all of last year!"

The start-up of the main line for permanent operation will provide access to the treasures of an enormous region (just the adjacent zone totals 1.5 million square kilometers) and for transit to the Amur and Maritime areas and to Yakutia, shortening the route to these areas by hundreds of kilometers. In addition, the pressure on the overburdened Trans-Siberian Railway will be relieved, and an extremely short route will become available from Europe to Japan and back.

If the construction of BAM had been put off another 20 years or so and the railway had been placed into operation in the year 2010, let us say, the nation would have

experienced increasingly frequent breakdowns, followed by the jamming, of the Trans-Siberian Railway, with all the consequences. (The traffic load here is already 2.3-fold greater than the average for the system, after all. It is time for the trains to be given the green light).

In short, let there be no doubt that BAM is a road to the future.

'Reduced' Military Equipment On Sale to Public, Enterprises

18010718 Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 9 May 89 p 2

[Unsigned article; 'From The Army Hangers'

[Text] The military-automotive equipment which, in connection with the reduction of the armed forces has been designated "for demobilization" has been moved out from army hangars directly onto the sales floor. At this unusual fair, conducted by the BSSR Republican Gosnab Commercial Center, powerful ZILs, URALs, KAMAZs, and GAZs which have done their service in the Belorussian Military District and in the GSFG can be obtained by co-op owners, renters and even private individuals. Two-hundred orders have already been received and not only for automobiles but also for clothing and other equipment.

For example, personal protection equipment is enjoying popularity especially among hunting and fishing enthusiasts.

Accounting Problems in Use of Military Aircraft for Civilian Economy

18010664 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian 11 May 89 p 3

[Article by Yu. Lodkin: "A Contract for the 'Ruslan'"]

[Text] Military Transport Aviation (VTA) is prepared to deliver to any point in the country large express loads beyond the capacity of railroad and automotive transport. As announced, the USSR Council of Ministers has ruled that aircraft of the USSR Ministry of Defense may transport freight for the national economy. "Commercial run," "cost-accounting agreement," "contract": these purely "civilian" concepts will soon become familiar to military pilots too. VTA has served the interests of the national economy before now. But the regiment in question has performed non-military runs only periodically. On the whole its annual accrued flying time has been characterized as "performance in a training capacity."

"We burn thousands of tons of fuel 'transporting air,'" complained Regimental Deputy Commander K. Borodin. "If we could get off the circuit of empty runs we could be of use to the national economy without doing any harm to our defense capability."

I had occasion to make today's commercial trip to Central Asia with the crew commanded by Major V. Ostroukhov. He had been detailed to transport cargo at the request of the Kiev Aviation Production Association imeni the 50th Anniversary of October. The crew was aware that the load was too large to be transported by railway. The very fact that an airplane was undertaking the transportation of such cargo is cause for amazement. Just recently its only advantage over other types of transport was speed. But with the appearance in the skies of the "Antey" and "Ruslan" aircraft, aviation was accorded new priorities. Among them, increased carrying capacity (at a Paris exhibition the "Ruslan" flew a record load of more than 170 tons), and the ability to perform extended nonstop flights. The cargo compartment measures more than 40 meters in length, 6.5 meters in length, and almost 4.5 meters in height.

"Another merit of the 'Ruslan' is its mechanized loading system," emphasized the crew's flight engineer V. Golovatskiy. "It can lift any cargo on board. Or vehicles can drive into the cargo compartment under their own power—a hydraulic device 'seats' the airplane on the ground so that the angle of ascent of the loading ramp is only eight degrees."

In Tashkent the "Ruslan" had hardly completed its landing when the crew commander was instructed where to taxi for loading. Beside the concrete runway were waiting five containers of imposing size delivered by the sender—the Tashkent Aviation Production Association imeni V. P. Chkalov. Before long the airport truck tractor had hauled the first container up to the open cargo compartment at the tail of the aircraft. S. Golovanov, landing equipment flight engineer, and A. Savkin, senior air radio operator, simultaneously brought the hooks from two five-ton crane jibs to the cargo. The entire flight crew participated in the loading.

As on any other loading area, the words "heave" and "lift" were heard. Captain S. Golovanov repeated with a gesture the command he had given aloud. And the container moved through the opening of the cargo hatch. It just fit through. There were barely centimeters under the lower edge of the container, and hardly more space on top. Without any bumping or misalignment the large load "floated" almost 30 meters and settled onto multi-layered wooden pads. A little more than an hour passed, and the cargo bay doors closed behind the last container.

"That was careful work," said representative of the Kiev aircraft builders V. Levanovich to the commander of the airplane.

The airplane took off again. It climbed to a height of 10,600 meters through the "stages of authorized transition levels." After five hours of flight the landing strip of one of the Kiev airports spread out in front of us.

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A column of automobiles was already waiting for the cargo we carried. The containers were taken off the airplane and whisked away to the workshops of the aviation production association.

"The mission has been completed without incident," reported Major V. Ostroukhov as he returned to base.

The trip did indeed pass without incident, but several problems became apparent nonetheless. For instance, our "Ruslan" flew half of the 7,000 kilometers of the route without cargo. The customer will pay for everything. But is it really sensible to fly the powerful aircraft from the center of Russia to Central Asia without a load? Could not an accompanying express load have been found for it? In the meantime, the civilian airlines are literally choking with freight transportation. There is a need for an intermediary firm which will take on the search for clients in need of air transport services.

The application of economic accountability to peacetime freight transportation requires the introduction of contractual foundations in relations between customers and

military aviation in order to define in detail their mutual material responsibility for the effective utilization of air transport. On our trip the loading and unloading progressed without any delays. But what if the sender does not deliver the cargo to the airport at the designated hour? This sort of thing happens often, but the airmen do not require the customer to pay for the forced idle time of the airplane. By the same token, VTA does not bear material accountability for the timely delivery of the freight to the designated point.

All the members of the flight crew participate in the loading and unloading. However they work for free, and that is unjust. It seems that the customer should pay for the execution of labor which is not part of the crew's official duties. And in order to increase participation by VTA sub-units in the transport of freight for the national economy, a fixed portion of the profits should be put at the disposal of the regiment. The airmen would like to use their earnings for improvements in the conditions of their daily life.

Role of Rail Transport in WWII Considered
*18010580 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA
INDUSTRIYA in Russian 9 May 89 p 3*

[Interview of I. Kovalev by N. Khlebodarov: "The Special Missions of General Kovalev"]

[Text] I was lucky: I was the last of the journalists to meet with the celebrated Marshal Georgiy Konstantinovich Zhukov. I recall that I asked him then: "Whose names should we mention first, among the creators of victory?..."

Georgiy Konstantinovich thought about it and answered: "I think I would name General Kovalev first. Without good railroads we could have implemented neither the large operational transport movements, comparatively frequent during the war, nor the continuous long-distance supply movements. It was Kovalev who organized this gigantic task so that not one major military operation was guessed by the enemy, even though whole armies were redeployed under his nose. Rail transport played an exceptional role in the first hard months of the Great Patriotic War, handling the evacuation and redeployment of forces to the front line. I believe that the role and importance of this sector in our Victory has gone virtually without due appreciation. Try to get him talking. He has stories to tell."

I.V. Kovalev is now a professor, and a member of the transportation section of the USSR Academy of Sciences, a member of scholarly councils of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations, and of the Military-Political Academy imeni V. I. Lenin.

[Khlebodarov] In the very first hours of the war, a significant portion of Soviet aviation was destroyed on the frontier airfields. The nearest railroad junctions and bridges were left without air cover, and fascist aviation began to bomb the communications lines of frontier oblasts at a distance of up to 500 kilometers. The Hitlerites did everything to separate the rear and front, and to prevent a strategic concentration of forces.

[Kovalev] On the third day of the war I was summoned to Stalin. I had never seen him like that: despondent, his eyes bloodshot. "You ran the Western Road, you are familiar with it. Units have bogged down on its lines. Go and check it on site. It is urgent that they be redeployed to the Western Front. Keep in mind, we have nothing to cover the transport. A lot of the aviation has been destroyed due to treachery or carelessness, I still don't know.

Your mission: to secretly redeploy the armies of Lukin and Kurochkin. We have to close the Smolensk axis. The enemy is heading for Moscow!"

[Khlebodarov] The first "jam" was in the rayon of Orsha.

"Why have trains been allowed to accumulate at the railway junctions?", Kovalev asked the directors of the line.

"That's the way it's always been", was the answer. The amount of rolling stock was determined from the status at 1800 hours, the start of the accounting day. Everyone tried to collect more trains in order to hand them on to neighbors.

Only by the end of the day was it possible to restore one branch line, assembled from intact rails, and the troop trains departed for the front. He found a similar picture in Smolensk, and also had to "untangle" the Bryansk junction. There he also met the deputy Narkom [people's commissar] for Transport Communications, S. I. Bagayev. They began to seek a solution to the problem.

It had already been noted that the enemy was operating in a pattern: in the evening he would bomb, and in the morning a scout aircraft would fly in to photograph the result. This meant respites between bombing had to be used to restore the lines, pump houses, coal dumps, and loading centers. The rest should not be touched.

An order was signed: "No trains should be at railroad junctions before 2100 hours, remove all to small stations, camouflage on the tracks."

The reliance of the Hitlerites on powerful strikes against transport communications lines and junctions continued, but it did not have the planned result.

The most important thing that Kovalev brought away from this difficult mission was the surprising calmness and bravery of the railroad workers. There was no case of even a single operator leaving a train during bombing. They only asked him: "Give us submachineguns or cannon! The fascist pilots are simply insolent—they chase after the trains. We aren't afraid of them, but it would be better if we would defend ourselves."

Soon Kovalev was urgently summoned to Moscow.

[Kovalev] This was the problem: the railroads had to operate. For this it was necessary immediately to strengthen the defense of bridges, and each train had to be given one or two air defense guns for protection against planes.

On the other hand, there were a lot of complaints that shipments were being sent, but did not arrive at their destination. In the Narkomat [People's Commissariat] of Transport Communications they responded that shipments always get lost in a war.

It turned out that a most strict procedure had been violated, that of assigning a special code to each car, without which the shipment would slip out of military

control. Cars with ammunition and arms were being sent like ordinary shipments. The terrible picture we found was enough to make your hair stand on end.

The fact was that the "director of roads", Narkom Kaganovich, proposed avoiding "excessive" documentation, and assigning codes to 8-10 cars at a time. That would make it "easy" to run things.

The consequences of this step began to spread in a chain reaction over all the lines. For example, hay and oats for cavalry formations moved in large lots, as military cargo, but ammunition and arms, which were sent in 3-5 cars, were pushed off onto spare lines.

There was one solution: conduct an all-union census of all cargoes on the roads. For this it was necessary to create commissions at all stations that were to open each car not part of a military train and ascertain the nature of the cargo. Cars found with ammunition and weapons were assigned a transport time and quickly sent on to their destination.

It was at that time that I was appointed chief of the Directorate of Military Transport Communications of the General Staff.

[Khlebodarov] Headquarters, Supreme Command justly thought that the success of any strategic operation lay in its surprise. This was not achieved without profound secrecy, so the initial plan of an operation was known only to a narrow circle of persons; As the chief of the Directorate of Military Transport Communications, Kovalev was among this number.

A procedure was even established whereby every day, often even several times a day, the chief of the Directorate of Military Transport Communications reported to the Chief of the General Staff and the Supreme Commander regarding the advance of military formations.

The carrying capacity of the roads was not sufficient; it was necessary to find methods of troop transport that were inconceivable by prewar standards. They even circumvented a traffic safety law that had been inviolable for railroad men, which said that only one train could be in the space between two stations. What was to be done, when the war had multiplied freight volume by two to five times? Double and triple trains were created, and they shifted to a "living block system": soldiers with green and red flags were placed along the line at braking distance and replaced the traffic lights. Thanks to this the trains followed at intervals not of an hour, as the traffic schedule called for, but every 15 minutes, at times even 10 minutes.

Since all information was known to Kovalev, he soon noticed that new requests for transport were not coming from the Main Artillery Directorate.

[Kovalev] I called my namesake, Kovalev, Herman Vasilyevich, the deputy Narkom for Transport Communications: "What's going on? How come no requests?"

"Marshal Kulik was here and said that he would not "waste time on paperwork", but would make his requests directly to Narkom Kaganovich", he replied. I cautioned Herman Vasilyevich as the person responsible for liaison with the Directorate of Military Transport Communications that not a single request from the Marshal had been received.

After some time, a Colonel came to me from Kulik: "The Marshal said that he wanted to talk with you! Call him!"

The talk began with obscenities. "Who the hell are you?", the receiver roared. "You started the double-entry bookkeeping. What are you, the Narkom of Transport Communications?"

"I can swear worse than that", I interrupted Kulik. "If you don't want to deal with the chief of the Directorate of Military Transport Communications, I could call you to account as the deputy Narkom of State Control."

I at once called the Supreme Command and reported our "quiet" talk.

I was summoned within an hour. In the "presidium" were Kulik, Beriya, and Vosnesenskiy, and about 15 men unknown to me. "We were counting on you," Vosnesenskiy began the talk. "The situation is difficult. Do you know that a force of 100 divisions is on the move, and they must..." - "I categorically protest", I was forced to interrupt him. "The audience does not have access to this data. It is a state secret, for the divulgence of which..." - "Who do you require?", Beria asked. "Of those present, no one! If we are going to talk of transport movements, then invite Kaganovich, Kovalev, and Gusev, the deputies who handle transport movements. And you must report to Politburo Andrey Andreyevich Andreyev. Only in their presence can I show the operational maps on troop trains and supply stock. I will report what is located where. For the rest, let the Narkom of Transport Communications lines report."

After a brief pause, we assembled again. I opened up the maps and reported in detail. "Kaganovich will report about the rest!"

"Don't be insolent", he snapped. "The road is in our hands for the time being!"

"I am not being insolent, Lasar Moisevich! You accepted the cargo, so report. I will not take responsibility for what isn't on my map."

"Report!", Kaganovich turned to his deputy Kovalev.

"Comrade commissar! Kulik's loads did not get on the maps, and we do not know where they are. I can only give the loading points."

"Get out, you old bumbler!", Kaganovich interrupted. "You never know anything. Go work!"

"Gusev, report!"

"I can repeat only what "ER" said. He's right!"

"Look here! When you talk to me, name names. What is this "ER" supposed to be, a nickname?"

"ER" is the code of the chief of the Directorate of Military Transport Communications. Surely you knew?", Gusev was astonished. "I warned Marshal Kulik that we could not take responsibility for his cargo. However he insisted on sending it by the ordinary way, without a code."

That same day a document was issued forbidding changes in the movement of military trains. Only the chief of the Directorate of Military Transport Communications, with consent of the General Staff or personally from the Supreme Commander, was allowed to make corrections. And that's the way it was until the end of the war..."

[Khlebodarov] Indeed the railroads became a most important material factor of the war, and its system of control made it possible to maintain military shipments on any scale in complete secrecy. It was no accident that the reports of our allies in the anti-Hitler coalition stressed: "One should note the excellent use of railroads by the Russians; they have carried out strategic concentration and deployment of one or several armies in incredibly short times". An eloquent assessment!

After all, the volume of evacuation shipments in the first period of the war was 1 million 600 thousand cars, the volume of military shipments, 1 million 280 thousand cars. And how many internal shipments were there, to supply military industry and civilian needs!

The enemy was at the approaches to Moscow. The train stations were crammed full with military and evacuation trains. All types of shipments were done on the same lines, and army warehouses and bases, and frontline distribution stations were set up on the grounds of the junctions. Regular traffic control of the trains led to paralysis of all frontline networks of communications lines. A new control system was required.

Back in the Finnish campaign, Kovalev had proposed "mobile" control of a new type: locomotive brigades, repair trains, in short, all professions necessary for exploitation and restoration of railroads, should be in a

single military subunit. On 24 October 1941, a military-exploitation directorate of the junction in Moscow was formed, with eleven military-exploitation sections subordinate to it. This substantially facilitated work on the railroads.

The battles at Moscow were hard, and special flexibility and efficiency were required from the transport workers. Zhukov executed simply fantastic maneuvers in order to "close" breeches in the defense. For example, in two hours on the night of 10 October, 1942, the order came for loading and immediate transport of two tank brigades to the rayon of the city of Kalinin. By normal redeployment methods this task was impossible.

But the Directorate of Military Transport Communications organized unilateral movement from Gorky to Kalinin. Previously prepared locomotives were quickly changed, and stops did not take more than ten minutes.

Experience was quickly accumulated in the battle of Moscow. Thanks to this, the movement of reserves from Siberia was carried out at a speed of more than 1,000 kilometers per day.

[Kovalev] It is well known that on 7 November there was a parade of troops in Red Square, from which the troops went directly to the front. But there are few who recall that on this same day there was a parade in Kuybyshev, where the Soviet government and diplomatic corps were located. Troops from Siberia participated, but they could not be held up more than half a day.

On arrival in Kuybyshev, I contacted Voroshilov and Vosnesenskiy and conveyed to them Stalin's order regarding the parade.

On the night of 7 November, not far from Kuybyshev, several Siberian divisions were unloaded and in the morning passed before members of the government and diplomacy in the central square.

You should have seen the faces of the foreign diplomats. Many supposed that Russia had no reserves, that the fall of Moscow was a matter of a few days.

The troops were immediately loaded onto trains and sent to Moscow.

[Khlebodarov] A striking statistic in the period of the defense of Moscow: almost 3 thousand main and 4.5 thousand kilometers of station lines were destroyed, 1,120 trains were crippled, 261 locomotives and 4,775 cars, and the traffic schedule of trains was disrupted 2,034 times.

However under these most difficult conditions and limited opportunities for repairing the roads, interruptions in traffic never lasted more than six hours.

It is hard to overestimate the role of railroad transport in the defense of Moscow.

[Kovalev] However, in the heat the battle of Moscow one could still find people in the government who suggested...eliminating the railroad troops and using their personnel as rifle units.

In November 1941 a commission was created that was headed by the chief of the Main Political Directorate of the RKKA, L. Z. Mekhlis, and the deputy Narkom for Transport Communications I.D. Gotseridze. All except for me called for the elimination of the railroad troops. Even the chief of the General Staff, V. M. Shaposhnikov consented to this.

I opposed. After all, with the shift of our troops to the offensive, the fascists would begin to destroy all communications lines. We would have to move over scorched earth. Who would restore these roads, on which the rate of advance would depend?

The decision of the commission was rejected.

Our counterattack at Moscow showed the deficiency of the country's transport system. There was no connection with other types of transport, especially in regions with undeveloped rail systems. As before, we military people experienced many problems from the poor work of the Narkomat of Transport Communications: they were all meetings and calls "on the carpet".

In one of my reports to Stalin, I expressed my ideas to improve transport work. I proposed creating a transport committee in the State Defense Committee [GKO], which would combine the efforts of all types of transport. This proposal aroused desperate protest, especially on the part of the Narkomat of Transport Communications: "More committees in the heat of war?". However the State Defense Committee and the Politburo of the CC, VKP(b) accepted the proposal at a joint session...

[Khlebodarov] Now with the rank of GKO representative, Kovalev had to travel to various lines to acquaint himself with facts and establish order. Based on his report, an edict was adopted "On reviving traffic and creating stability in the railroad operation". Military order was also introduced to other types of transport, their consolidation was organized, and the passage of freight and troops accelerated.

[Kovalev] It was strange that the American government very quickly eliminated private barriers, creating a Department of Transportation along the lines of our Transportation Committee. Here on the contrary, this process gradually accumulated "departmental barriers", until finally each type of transport acquired complete

independence. Cargoes began to be transported in parallel, toward one another, and unconnected railroad junctions, river docks, transhipment points, etc. began to appear. Of course this occurred when the war was already over.

[Khlebodarov] In the second half of 1942, the attention of all countries was fixed on Stalingrad, where a pitched battle was taking place. The Supreme Command ordered that eight armies be redeployed there.

In a record short time, a railroad was built and crossings erected over the Volga.

With a group of specialists, Kovalev visited the Stalingrad region in order to organize train traffic. The concentration of forces was carried out in the strictest secrecy. All information was transmitted by the commanders personally via Kovalev, even telephone conversations were forbidden. For coordination of actions, Kovalev personally reported the situation only to Stalin, A.A. Andreyev, G. M. Malenkov, A. I. Mikoyan, and the chief of the General Staff, with several deputies. These "living" communications were most difficult.

But despite this, from 1 July 1942 to 1 January 1943, more than 200 thousand cars with troops and military cargoes were moved to the Stalingrad region. The battle of Stalingrad was an academy for our transport workers, and this experience came in handy in the battle of Kursk, where Germany hoped to take revenge for the defeat. The volume of shipments to the Kursk Salient exceeded 540 thousand cars.

[Kovalev] Hitler's command naturally assumed that we could not restore destroyed roads so quickly, or build new ones. Keitel spoke openly of this. Foreign specialists generally assumed that we were having real difficulties in the offense. And there was some truth to this, because the restoration of roads of itself was difficult work, but then they had to be built so fast, without adequate rails, and with uncured ties into which two or three spikes were driven. Operating speed over them fell to 15 kilometers per hour. Rates of restoration of roads and bridges were unprecedented.

[Khlebodarov] With the shift of military actions beyond the bounds of USSR borders, it was necessary to resolve a very serious problem: to organize military shipments with allowance for the different gauge of tracks on Soviet and foreign railroads.

[Kovalev] When we crossed the USSR frontier, the question came up at once: should we alter the European railroads to our gauge? The Narkomat of Transport Communications was "for". But it was obvious to me that Europe was not Russia: the fill of the roadbed was less there, so in some places it was even impossible to expand the road. Another consideration: where would we get such a mass of rolling stock? But most importantly, how would we control the railroad? On the dense

railroad network of Europe we could lose not only civilian, but also military cargoes. And indeed, expenses for altering European railroads would be so enormous that we could not raise them.

After long arguments with Kaganovich, my variant was accepted: alter one main road, and connect all European roads to it. However, local specialists would manage them under our direction.

[Khlebodarov] But the Narkomat of Transport Communications increasingly slipped into sheer administrative functions. Ominous symptoms of stagnation of railroad transport were noted, and the norm for loading and unloading cars began to fall. Many cargoes piled up at mines and plants. A closed circle formed: accumulated coal at mines could not be carried off, because there was no...coal for the locomotives. It was especially hard in Siberia.

It was necessary immediately to restructure the work of the Narkomat of Transport Communications in order to do the job at the concluding stage of the war.

Kaganovich was relieved of the duties of Narkom of Transport Communications. Kovalev was appointed in his place.

The battle for Berlin was still ahead. Just two weeks were allotted for preparation for the attack. After the war Marshal Zhukov remarked: "In order to imagine the scale of all these shipments, suffice to say that if the trains with the cargoes sent for this operation were lined up in a straight line, they would stretch more than 1,200 kilometers".

A special feature of the Berlin operation was that the railroad troops not only supported military actions, but also supported the reviving economy of Europe with everything necessary. More than 55 thousand kilometers of railroads and thousands of bridges and depots were restored.

Increase in Size, Scope of U.S.-Japanese Aviation Exercises

18010676 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
19 May 89 First Edition p 3

[Article by Col V. Samsonov under the rubric "Militaristic Rehearsals": "Forgetting About 'Self-Defense'"]

[Text] Various exercises and maneuvers have a special place in the joint combat training of Japanese and American armed forces. The largest such activity for the air forces of the two nations are the quarterly tactical exercises "Cope North," which have been conducted since 1978.

These exercises involve training in gaining air supremacy and the tactical procedures for striking land and naval targets, as well as command and control of Japanese and American aircraft by means of E-3B AWACS and E-2C Hawkeye aircraft. One or two air bases in the combat training areas of one of Japan's three air sectors are ordinarily involved in "Cope North." In the Northern Air Sector they are the Misawa and Titose air bases; in the Central Air Sector, the Komazu air base; in the Western Air Sector, the Nyutabaru and Tsuiki (Kyushu Island) and Iwakuni (southwestern part of Honshu Island) air bases. The Naha and Kadena air bases are used in the area of Okinawa. Typically, more than half of all the "Cope North" exercises are conducted in Japan's northern regions. Each exercise lasts 5-6 days. Practically all the subunits of Japan's combat aviation have participated in "Cope North." Frequently involved on the American side are subunits of fighters based at Kadena and Misawa airfields and U.S. marine aircraft from Iwakuni.

It is a revealing fact that the composition of the forces involved is enlarged each year, and the missions carried out grow more complex. From 18 to 24 Japanese and American aircraft participated in the "Cope North" exercises at the end of the '70s and the beginning of the '80s, for example. They flew 120 sorties, mainly practicing multi-aircraft aerial combat and air target interceptions. American Marine and Air Force combat squadrons and deck-based aircraft from the aircraft-carrier Midway subsequently began to be involved in the exercises. Combat aircraft transferred from the continental USA also periodically take part in "Cope North."

In the second half of the '80s the number of combat aircraft taking part in the exercises was increased to 80, and the average number of sorties rose above 300. Tactical procedures for the comprehensive use of aircraft for performing air defense missions for facilities and groupings of troops and the gaining of air supremacy are now practiced along with multi-aircraft air battles.

There has been a gradual transition to practicing strikes against land and naval targets, including targets located a considerable distance from Japan. A significant element in the exercises in 1987-88 was their scheduling to coincide

with the final exercises of Japan's air force. Last year, for example, the "Cope North" exercise was conducted as part of the annual "Soen-63" exercises of Japan's air force. As many as 60 F-15 and F-16 combat aircraft took part in it on the U.S. side alone. According to reports in the Japanese newsletter KOKU TSUSIN, the reinforcement of the U.S. grouping of combat aircraft in the northern part of Japan has been accomplished by transferring aircraft from Kadena to Misawa and Titose.

In general, trends in the conduct of American-Japanese exercises like "Cope North" demonstrate a departure by Tokyo from the "self-defense" concept to which that nation's political leaders so frequently refer.

U.S. 'Blue Flag' Exercise Example of Pentagon's Hostile Intent

18010694 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
30 May 89 First Edition p 3

[Article by Colonel B. Denisov under the rubric "Militaristic Rehearsal": "'Blue Flag' Over Florida"]

[Text] Four times a year the little American town of Hurlburt Field, located on the grounds of the airfields of Eglin Air Force Base in Florida, becomes crowded and busy. Commanders and representatives from the staffs of the U.S. Air Force Tactical Air Command (TAC) and the U.S. Army come here to take part in the command post exercise "Blue Flag."

The first exercise of this type was conducted in December 1976. The exercises were organized in response to an analysis of the actions of American forces in the aggression against the Vietnamese people. The U.S. military command was alarmed by the absence of coordination between air and ground forces in the course of joint combat operations, resulting, in the long run, in appreciable losses. The decision was made to conduct the "Blue Flag" exercise in order to give the staffs of the U.S. Air Force and Army peacetime training in making proper decisions concerning the combat use of tactical aviation to support ground troops.

The activities of the combatants (the "blues" are the American forces, and the "reds" are the forces of the opponent) are conducted at a specially equipped facility in Hurlburt Field where a mock headquarters for tactical aviation in the theater of operations has been set up. About 50 airplanes comprise the air components allotted to the "blues," including tactical fighters, tactical reconnaissance aircraft, airborne command posts, EW [electronic warfare] aircraft, and AWACS [airborne warning and control system] DRLO [long-range radar early-warning] and command and control aircraft. When necessary, depending on the situation, strategic bombers and aerial tankers are used.

Radar for acquisition, reporting and target designation of antiaircraft missile systems and antiaircraft artillery has been set up at the training ground for evaluation of

the actions of flight crews in the antiaircraft zones of the opponent. These radar sites work in the transmission mode of the RLS [radar] of the armed forces of the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries. The majority of these systems are equipped with recording monitors, and the data is used to analyze the actions of tactical aircraft flight crews in the execution of maneuvers to evade missiles and antiaircraft fire in the engagement envelope of the opponent's PVO [air defense].

Depending on the exercise scenario and the strategic and tactical environment planned for "Blue Flag," up to 1,000 servicemen are involved. There is a wide range of representation. Officers and generals of the staff of the U.S. Air Force Tactical Air Command and the 9th and

12th Air Forces (stationed on the territory of the continental United States) undergo training here. Representatives from the staffs of Army and Navy (if the scenario provides for operations in coastal sectors, i.e., on the Korean peninsula) participate. Representatives from various other U.S. Air Force commands are also involved, as well as officers from Air Force staffs of allied states in West Europe, the Near East, and the Far East.

The "Blue Flag" presently "flying" over North America testifies to the fact that the Pentagon continues to make militaristic preparations regardless of the realities of today's world.

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